Two Athenian fathers ask two generals whether their sons should learn to fight in armor, and Socrates turns the question into a failed hunt for a definition of courage.
Laches is one of Plato's shorter Socratic dialogues, set as two old friends, Lysimachus and Melesias, seek advice on educating their sons. They have just watched a demonstration of fighting in armor and ask two generals, Nicias and Laches, whether the skill is worth learning. Laches dismisses it as useless showmanship (illustrated by the comic story of Stesilaus and his sickle-spear stuck in a ship's rigging); Nicias defends it as good training. Unable to agree, they call in Socrates, who redirects the whole inquiry: the real question is not which subject to teach but who is qualified to care for the young men's souls, and that requires first knowing what virtue is.
Socrates narrows the target to one part of virtue, courage, and asks Laches to define it. Laches first says courage is standing firm in the ranks against the enemy, but Socrates points out that the Spartans won at Plataea by retreating and wheeling around like cavalry, so courage must cover more than standing your ground. Laches then tries "a kind of endurance of the soul," but Socrates shows that reckless endurance without wisdom is often called foolish, not courageous, so mere endurance cannot be the answer. Nicias then proposes that courage is "the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared," a formula he says he learned from Socrates himself. Socrates and Laches examine this: doctors and prophets have specialized knowledge of danger but are not thereby courageous, so Nicias narrows it to knowledge of future good and evil specifically. Socrates then shows that all real knowledge, including this kind, must equally grasp past, present, and future, which means Nicias's definition ends up describing not one part of virtue but the whole of virtue at once.
The dialogue ends in acknowledged failure: none of the three men can say what courage is, despite two of them being generals who supposedly embody it in action. Socrates proposes the only honest next step: that all of them, old men included, go find a real teacher and start learning, rather than pretending they already know. The dialogue is valued less for any positive doctrine than for its method — testing whether a life and its words "harmonize," as Laches puts it, and for showing how confidently people speak about virtues they cannot actually define.
“if there were anything to it, it could not have escaped the notice of the Spartans, who care about nothing else in life except seeking out and practicing whatever will give them an advantage over others in war”
— Laches · read this chapter →
“not every kind of endurance, I think, appears to you as courage”
— Laches · read this chapter →
“the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared, in war and in everything else”
— Laches · read this chapter →
“we all landed in the same perplexity alike — so which of us should any of us prefer?”
— Laches · read this chapter →
“a needy man ought not to let shame stand in his way”
— Laches · read this chapter →
It is a dialogue about whether young Athenian men should train in fighting with armor, which quickly turns into an inquiry into what courage actually is. Two generals, Laches and Nicias, each propose a definition of courage, and Socrates shows both definitions fail, leaving the question unresolved.
Laches first says courage is standing firm in the ranks against the enemy without fleeing, then revises it to 'a kind of endurance of the soul.' Socrates refutes both: the first fails because the Spartans won a battle by retreating and wheeling around, and the second fails because reckless, unwise endurance is not admirable.
Nicias defines courage as 'the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared, in war and in everything else,' a formula he says he heard from Socrates. Socrates shows this knowledge, since it must cover past, present, and future goods and evils like any real knowledge, ends up being the whole of virtue rather than one part of it.
It ends in aporia: Nicias, Laches, and Socrates all admit they cannot say what courage is, despite two of them being generals. Socrates proposes that everyone present, regardless of age, should go seek out a genuine teacher rather than remain as they are.
Lysimachus and Melesias are aging Athenians seeking advice on their sons' education; Nicias and Laches are Athenian generals asked for that advice; Socrates is called in to settle their disagreement and redirects the whole conversation toward the nature of courage.
The dialogue is valued as a model of Socratic method: it shows confident public men failing to define a virtue they are supposed to embody, and it demonstrates that even reputable expertise (military command) does not guarantee philosophical self-knowledge.
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