Tertullian · a new plain-English translation from the original language
Which repentances, then, should be counted just and owed — that is, which are properly charged to an offense — is a point the subject calls for us to mark, though it may seem a waste of effort to belabor. For once the Lord is known, the spirit, of its own accord, looks back to its own Author and rises to a knowledge of the truth; and once admitted to the Lord's precepts, it is instructed straightaway from them as to what is to be reckoned sin — sin from which may God keep us far — since, God being agreed to be a supremely good thing, nothing but evil could displease the good, there being no friendship between contraries. Still, it will not be wearisome to sketch this much: that some offenses are carnal, that is, of the body, and some are spiritual — for since man is put together out of this union of a twofold substance, he can sin from no other source than the source he is made of. But they do not differ from one another simply because body and spirit are two things; rather they are all the more equal for that, because the two make one — lest anyone, on account of the diversity of their materials, should so distinguish their sins as to reckon the one lighter or heavier than the other. Indeed both flesh and spirit are God's handiwork, the one shaped by his hand, the other perfected by his breath; since, then, they belong to the Lord in equal measure, whichever of the two sins offends the Lord in equal measure. Would you really try to separate the acts of flesh and spirit, when in life and in death and in resurrection there is so much fellowship and partnership between them that they are raised together, together, either to life or to judgment — precisely because they have offended together or acted innocently together? We have set this out first so that we may understand that the necessity of repentance presses no less on the one part than on both together, should either offend; the guilt of both is shared, their judge is shared — God, that is — and so the remedy of repentance is shared as well. Hence they are named 'spiritual' and 'bodily' sins according to whether the offense is done or merely thought: bodily, when it lies in a deed, because a deed, being bodily, can be seen and touched; spiritual, when it lies in the mind, because, being spirit, it is neither seen nor grasped. By which it is shown that not only the sins of deed but also the sins of will must be avoided and cleansed by repentance. For even if human mediocrity can judge only the deed, being no match for the hidden places of the will, that is no reason why we, before God, should overlook its crimes as well. God suffices for everything; nothing lies removed from his sight where an offense could occur unnoticed by him; since he neither fails to know nor neglects to bring it to judgment — he is no dissembler, no traitor to his own clear sight! What of the fact that the will is the origin of the deed? Let exceptions stand for whatever is chargeable to chance, necessity, or ignorance; apart from those, nothing is ever sinned except by the will. Since, then, it is the origin of the deed, is it not the more liable to punishment for being the principal party to the guilt? And it is not even released from guilt when some difficulty intercepts its execution; for it is charged to itself, nor can it be excused by that failure to carry through, having already done its own part. Indeed, how does the Lord show that he builds an addition onto the Law, if not precisely by forbidding sins of the will as well? He defines as an adulterer not only the man who has actually fallen into another man's marriage-bed, but also the one who has stained himself with the lust of a look. So dangerously does the mind represent to itself what it is forbidden to carry out, and rashly, by mere will, cancels the deed. Since the force of that will is such that, sating us with its own gratification, it stands in for the deed, then for the deed it will likewise face punishment. It is a hollow plea to claim, 'I meant to, but I never did it'; on the contrary, you ought to carry through, since you will it — or else not even to will it, since you do not carry it through. But in fact you pronounce the confession of your own conscience: for if you desired something good, you would have been eager to accomplish it; and if, being evil, you do not accomplish it, then you ought not to have desired it either. However you place yourself, you are bound to the charge — either for having willed the evil, or for not having fulfilled the good!