Against Celsus, Book 3

Origen · a new plain-English translation from the Greek

In the first of our books against Celsus’s boastful title — for he entitled the book he composed against us "True Word" — as you instructed, most faithful Ambrose, to the best of our ability we went through his preface and then, taking up each of the things he said in turn, examined them, until we came to the speech he puts in the mouth of the Jew, fabricated as though addressed to Jesus. And in the second book we took up the whole of it.

As best we could, we answered the points made against us—against those who through Christ believe in God—in the speech of that Jew of his. We now take up this, the third book, in which our task is to contend against what he sets out as though speaking in his own person. He says that Christians and Jews argue with each other most foolishly, and claims that our dialogue with one another about

Christ is no different from what the proverb calls "a fight over a donkey's shadow," and he supposes there is nothing dignified in the mutual inquiry of Jews and Christians, given that both believe that some savior was prophesied by a divine spirit as one who would come to dwell among the human race, yet no longer agree about whether the one prophesied has already come or not. For we Christians have believed that Jesus is the one who has come in accordance with what was prophesied,

whereas the majority of Jews remain at such a distance from trusting him that those alive at that time went so far as to conspire against Jesus, while those living now, endorsing what the Jews back then presumed to do against him, likewise continue to slander Jesus—claiming he had, through some form of sorcery, invented the notion that he was the one heralded by the prophets as coming to dwell among them, summoned according to Jewish ancestral custom

the Christ. Let Celsus, then, and those who are pleased with what he says against us, tell us whether it resembles a donkey's shadow that the Jewish prophets foretold beforehand the place of birth of the one who would lead those who have lived well and who form the portion belonging to God, and that a virgin would conceive Emmanuel, and that there would be such signs and wonders performed by the one prophesied, and that "with such

swiftness his word will run," and that the sound of his apostles would go out "into all the earth," and what he would suffer when condemned by the Jews, and how he would rise again. Did the prophets, then, say these things at random, with no plausibility at all moving them not merely to say them but even to judge them worthy of being written down? And is it likewise the case that so great

a nation as the Jews, who long ago took possession of a land of their own to inhabit, proclaimed some as prophets and rejected others as false prophets with no plausibility at all behind it? And was there nothing among them prompting them to number the words of those reckoned to be the later prophets together with the sacred books of Moses, trusted as they were? And can those who charge Jews and Christians with foolishness show us how it was possible for the

nation of the Jews to hold together, if there had been no promise of foreknowledge among them at all? And that while the surrounding nations each, according to their own ancestral customs, believed they received oracles and divinations from those they reckoned to be gods, these people alone, taught to despise all the so-called gods of the nations as not gods but demons (since their prophets said of them that

"every god of the nations is but a demon"), they had no one who promised to prophesy and who was able to draw away those who, out of desire for foreknowledge of the future, wished to desert to the demons found among the others. Consider, then, whether it is not necessarily the case that a whole nation, taught to despise the gods worshiped by the rest, should have been well supplied with prophets, who from the very outset display something greater and surpass the oracles found everywhere. Then

powers were at work everywhere, or in many places, as he himself cites further on, mentioning Asclepius as benefiting people and foretelling the future to whole cities devoted to him, such as Tricca, Epidaurus, Cos, and Pergamum; and Aristeas of Proconnesus, and a certain man of Clazomenae, and Cleomedes of Astypalaea. But it is only among the Jews, they claim, that devotion is offered to the God of the universe.

was there no sign or portent that cooperated with and confirmed their faith in the creator of the universe, together with the hope of living a greater life concerning something else? But how could such a thing be possible? For they would immediately have turned to worshiping the demons who gave oracles and received service, abandoning the God who was believed, only in word, to help them, but who in no way demonstrated his own manifestation.

But if this did not happen — if instead they endured countless sufferings rather than renounce Judaism and the law that goes with it, suffering now in Assyria, now in Persia, and now under Antiochus — how is it not established, on reasonable grounds, for those who disbelieve the extraordinary histories and prophecies, that these things were not fabrications,

but that some divine spirit, present as it were in the pure souls of the prophets — men who had taken on every labor on behalf of virtue — moved them to prophesy, some things for their own contemporaries and other things for those who came later, and especially concerning someone who would come to dwell among the human race as its savior? But if this is so, why do Jews and Christians dispute with one another about a donkey's shadow,

examining, on the basis of the prophecies which they both hold in common, whether the one who was prophesied has come or has not yet come at all but is still awaited? And even if it be granted to Celsus, as a hypothesis, that Jesus is not the one whom the prophets proclaimed, even so the inquiry into the meaning of the prophetic writings is no less something other than a dispute about a donkey's shadow — so that it might be clearly demonstrated

what sort of person the one heralded in advance was prophesied to be, and what he would do, and, if possible, also when he would come to dwell among us. Above, we already stated, citing a few prophecies out of many, that Jesus is the Christ who was prophesied. Neither the Jews, then, nor the Christians are mistaken in accepting that the prophets spoke by inspiration from God; rather, those who are mistaken about the one prophesied and awaited

hold false beliefs as to who he is and of what sort he has been proclaimed to be according to the true meaning of the prophets. Next after this, Celsus, supposing that the Jews, being Egyptian by race, abandoned Egypt after rebelling against the Egyptian community and scorning the customary religious practices of Egypt, says that they suffered, at the hands of those who attached themselves to Jesus and believed in him, the very things they themselves had done to the Egyptians.

as against Christ, and that for both the cause of the innovation was rebellion against the common order. Now what has Celsus done at this point? It must be examined. The ancient Egyptians treated the race of the Hebrews very badly in many ways, when they had come to sojourn in Egypt because famine had struck Judea. They then suffered, at the hands of divine providence, as an entire nation acting in concert, what a whole people that had wronged strangers and suppliants ought to suffer, having wronged

the whole race of those who had come to sojourn among them, though that race had done them no wrong at all. And when they had been struck by God's scourges, only with difficulty and not long after did they let go, to wherever they wished, those whom they had been enslaving unjustly. Being self-loving, then, and preferring in every way their own kin even over more just strangers, there is no accusation the Egyptians have left unmade that they have not spoken against Moses and the Hebrews — not denying outright the marvelous powers worked through Moses, but claiming

that these came about by sorcery and not by divine power. But Moses, since the events show him to have been not a sorcerer but a pious man devoted to the God of all and partaking of a more divine spirit, both established laws for the Hebrews as the divine voice spoke within him, and recorded the events as they truly happened. Celsus, then, not having become

a fair examiner of what is said one way among the Egyptians and another way among the Hebrews, but having been won over beforehand as by a fondness for the Egyptians, agreed with those who wronged the strangers as though they spoke truly, and said that the Hebrews, the ones who were wronged, left Egypt because they were rebelling — not seeing in what way so vast a rebellious multitude of Egyptians, if rebellion were its origin, could have become a nation while at the same time rebelling and also

changing its language, so that those who up to then used the Egyptian tongue should suddenly have come to speak fully the Hebrew dialect. But let it be granted, for the sake of argument, that in leaving Egypt they had come to hate even their native language along with it — how then, after this, did they not rather use the dialect of the Syrians, or that of the Phoenicians, but instead formed the Hebrew tongue as something distinct from both? What this argument wants

to establish for me is that it is false that people who were Egyptian by race rebelled against the Egyptians and left Egypt and came into Palestine and settled what is now called Judea. For the Hebrews had their own ancestral dialect before their descent into Egypt, and Hebrew letters were different from those of the Egyptians, and it was these that Moses used in writing the five books that are believed among the Jews

to be sacred. Likewise it is false that the Hebrews, being Egyptians, took their origin from rebellion, and that others, being Jews in the time of Jesus, rebelled against the common body of the Jews and followed Jesus. For Celsus, or those who agree with him, will not be able to point to any deed of rebellion on the part of the Christians. And yet if rebellion had been the

cause of the formation of the Christians, who took their origin from the Jews, for whom it was permitted both to take up arms in defense of their own and to kill their enemies, then the lawgiver of the Christians would not have forbidden altogether the killing of a human being — never teaching that it is just for his own disciples to venture violence against a human being, however wicked that person might be (for he did not think it fitting to his own divinely inspired legislation to allow

the killing of any person whatsoever), nor would Christians, if they had begun from insurrection, have accepted laws so gentle that they made it their lot to be killed "like sheep" and never to be able to defend themselves against their persecutors. And yet, examining the matter more deeply, one can say of those who came out of the land of Egypt that the whole people miraculously received all at once, as it were a gift of God,

the dialect called Hebrew, all together; as even one of their prophets said, that "when they went out of the land of Egypt, he heard a language which he did not know." And it must further be shown that those who left Egypt in the company of Moses were not Egyptian in stock; had they been Egyptians, their names ought to have been Egyptian names, since each language yields names akin to itself;

but since it is clear from the fact that their names are Hebrew that they were not Egyptians (for the scripture is full of Hebrew names, even of those given by people in Egypt to their sons), it is plain that what is said by the Egyptians is false—that though they were Egyptians they were driven out with Moses from Egypt. And it is quite evident that, being of Hebrew ancestors

according to the history recorded by Moses, they had their own dialect, from which they also gave names to their sons. As for the Christians, since, having been taught not to defend themselves against their enemies, they kept to the gentle and humane legislation, for this very reason—something they would not have accomplished had they taken up the right to wage war, even if they had been very capable of it—they have received this from God,

who has always fought on their behalf and, at the appointed times, has restrained those who set themselves against Christians and wished to destroy them. For as a reminder—so that, seeing a few contending for piety, others might become more approved and despise death—a few, at various times, and very easily numbered, have died for the reverence of God held by Christians, God preventing their whole nation from being utterly warred down; for he willed that it should be established and fill

the whole earth with this saving and most pious teaching; and again, so that the weaker might catch their breath from anxiety about death, God took forethought for those who believed, scattering by his will alone every plot against them, so that no king, no local ruler, and no populace could stir up lasting hostility toward them. This much, then,

in reply to what was said by Celsus about there having been an insurrection at the beginning—long ago in the case of the founding of the Jews, and later in the case of the Christians' coming into being. But since in what follows he plainly lies, come, let us set forth his own words, where he says: if all men wished to be Christians, these would no longer wish it. That this is false is clear from the fact that

as far as it depends on themselves, Christians do not neglect to sow the word everywhere in the inhabited world; some, at any rate, have made it their business to go about not only cities but also villages and farmsteads, in order to make others too devout toward God. And no one could say that they do this for the sake of wealth, since sometimes they do not even accept what is needed for food, and if ever they do,

they would be compelled by this scarcity to be content with mere necessity, even if they wished to share more with others and to give away what was beyond their needs. Now, then, perhaps — since, because of the multitude of people coming to the word, both wealthy people and some in positions of honor, and women of delicate and noble birth, welcome those who come from the word — someone will venture to say that, on account of

the little glory involved, certain people set themselves at the head of the teaching that concerns Christians. Yet it was not reasonable to suspect any such thing at the beginning, when the danger was greatest, above all for those who taught. And even now the disrepute among the rest outweighs the reputed glory among the like-minded, and even that is not shared by all. It is therefore a plain falsehood that, if all people wished to be

Christians, these men here would no longer wish to be. But see also what he says is the proof of this: that at the beginning, he says, they were few and of one mind, but once scattered into a multitude they are again cut apart and split, and each group wants to have its own faction; for this, he says, was what they wanted from the start. That in comparison with the multitude that followed, the Christians were few at the beginning is plain,

and yet they were not few in every sense, for the very thing that stirred envy against Jesus and provoked the Jews to their plot against him was the multitude of those who followed him into the deserted places — four and five thousand men following him, apart from the number of the women and children — so great, indeed, was a certain drawing power in the words of Jesus, that not only men

wished to follow him into the wilderness but women too, not making an excuse of feminine weakness or of what following the teacher into the wilderness would seem to involve; and quite unaffected children, either following their parents or perhaps also being led by his divinity, so that divinity might be sown in them, followed along with those who had begotten them. But let it be granted that they were few at the beginning;

what does this contribute toward showing that Christians would not have wished to produce persuasion about the word in all people? He also says that they were all of one mind, not seeing even in this that from the beginning there arose disagreements among believers concerning how the books held to be divine were to be understood — indeed, while the apostles were still preaching and the eyewitnesses of Jesus were still teaching his

teachings, no small inquiry arose among those who believed from the Jews concerning those coming to the word from the nations: whether they must observe the Jewish customs, or whether the "burden" concerning clean and unclean foods should be lifted as not being incumbent on those who, among the nations, had abandoned their ancestral ways and believed in Jesus. But indeed also in Paul's

letters — Paul having lived at the time of those who had seen Jesus — one finds certain statements suggesting that questions had arisen concerning the resurrection and whether it had "already occurred," and concerning the day of the Lord, whether it "is at hand" or not; and moreover the phrase "avoiding the profane babblings and contradictions of the falsely named knowledge, which some professing" "have made shipwreck concerning the faith" shows that from the beginning there arose

certain misapprehensions, not yet, as Celsus supposes, of many believers having arisen. Then, since he reproaches us, as if accusing the doctrine, concerning the sects that exist within Christianity, saying: "But having been scattered abroad into a multitude, they are again split and cut apart, and each wishes to have its own faction"; and he says that, being separated again on account of their numbers, they refute one another, still sharing, so to speak, in one thing

— the name, if indeed they still share even that — and this alone they are nevertheless ashamed to abandon, while the rest of their views are arranged differently by different people. To this we shall reply that heresies have arisen in no subject whose origin is not serious and useful to life. For medicine, being both needful and beneficial to mankind, has much that is disputed within it concerning

the manner of treating bodies, for this reason more numerous sects are admittedly found in medicine among the Greeks — and I think among the barbarians as well, as many of them as profess to practice medicine. Again, since philosophy, professing truth and knowledge of what exists, lays down how one ought to live and attempts to teach what is beneficial to our race, and the matters it inquires into involve much

protracted dispute, for this reason a very great many sects have arisen within philosophy, of which some are more well-known and others less so. But even Judaism had, as an occasion for the origin of sects, the differing interpretation of the writings of Moses and the words of the prophets. So then, since Christianity appeared to men to be something venerable — not only, as Celsus supposes, to the more slavish sort,

but also to many literary men among the Greeks — sects necessarily arose, not at all on account of factions and love of strife, but because many of the literary men as well were eager to understand the teachings of Christianity; and this followed from it: since they interpreted differently the divine words believed by all in common, sects arose named after those who admired the origin of the doctrine but were moved,

in whatever way it might be, by certain plausible arguments toward disagreements with one another. But no one would reasonably flee medicine on account of the sects within it, nor would anyone aiming at what is fitting hate philosophy, using its many sects as a pretext for hating it. So too, the holy writings of Moses and the prophets ought not to be condemned on account of the sects that exist among the Jews. But if

these things hold together logically, how shall we not likewise offer a defense also concerning the sects among Christians? Concerning which Paul seems to me to have spoken quite admirably: "For there must also be factions among you, so that those who are approved may become manifest among you." For just as the one approved in medicine is the one who, through having trained himself amid various schools and having fairly examined most of them, has chosen

the one that excels; and just as the one who makes great progress in philosophy does so by coming to know more, having trained himself among the various schools and attached himself to the argument that prevails — so too I would say that the one who has carefully examined the sects of Judaism and of Christianity becomes the wisest Christian. But whoever accuses the doctrine on account of its sects would also have to accuse the teaching of Socrates, from whose school many

schools that do not hold the same views. Indeed one might charge even Plato's doctrines with fault on account of Aristotle, who departed from his school to make innovations — a matter we have also discussed above. Now Celsus, it appears to me, has come to know of certain sects that do not even share with us the name of Jesus. For he had probably heard reports about the so-called Ophians and Caians, and if

there is any other such school that arose out of a complete falling away from Jesus — none of this, however, has any bearing on making the Christian teaching itself liable to blame. After this he says: 'And all the more remarkable is their agreement, the more it would be shown to have arisen from no worthy foundation.' But the worthy foundation is their sedition, and the benefit that comes through it, and the fear of outsiders; these are

what confirm their faith. To this too we shall reply that our agreement arises not in this way from a mere foundation — or rather, not from a foundation at all, but from a divine working — so that its origin is God, teaching human beings through the prophets to hope for the coming of Christ, who would save mankind. For to this extent it is not refuted as untrue, even if it seems to be refuted by unbelievers. To this extent

the message is established as the message of God, and Jesus, being Son of God, is shown to be so both before he became man and after he became man. And I maintain that even after he took on flesh, those whose souls possess the keenest sight still find him ever most fitting to God, truly one descended to us out of God — his origin, and all that follows from that origin, springing not from human understanding but from

the manifestation of God, who by manifold wisdom and manifold powers established first Judaism and after it Christianity. And the supposition that sedition, and the benefit that comes through sedition, is the origin of a teaching has likewise been refuted — a teaching that has converted and improved so many. And that the fear of outsiders is not what sustains our agreement either is clear from the fact that this too

was willed by God to have already ceased for a considerable time. And it is likely that the freedom from fear which has arisen in believers with respect to this present life will cease again, once those who in every way slander the teaching come to suppose that the cause of the sedition, now grown so great, lies in the multitude of believers not being warred against by the rulers in the same way as in former times. For we have learned from

the teaching neither to grow slack in peace and give ourselves over to relaxation, nor, when warred against by the world, to lose heart and fall away from love toward the God of all in Jesus Christ. We openly declare the dignity of our origin instead of concealing it, contrary to what Celsus supposes, since even for those newly being introduced we produce contempt for idols

and for all images, and beyond this, by raising their thinking up from serving created things instead of God, we bring them up to the Creator of all things; setting forth openly the one who was prophesied, both from the prophecies concerning him (and these are many) and from the accounts, examined with care, handed down to those able to hear more intelligently, of the Gospels and of the apostolic voices.

But as for what sorts of terrors, of every kind, we conjure up, or what fears we fabricate — as Celsus writes without any proof — let whoever wishes demonstrate it. Unless, that is, Celsus means to call "fabricated terrors" the teaching, built up with varied argument, partly from the scriptures and partly from plausible reasoning, about God as judge and about human beings being judged for everything they have done. And yet

(for truth is dear) Celsus says, near the end, that neither these people nor I nor anyone else should abandon the doctrine that the unjust will be punished and the just deemed worthy of rewards. What terrors, then, do we fabricate and use to draw people in, if you take away the doctrine of punishment? But also, when he says that the

misheard fragments of the ancient account, fabricating these, we pipe people up in advance and indoctrinate them beforehand, like those who buzz around people undergoing Corybantic frenzy — we will say to him: misheard fragments of which ancient account? For whether it is the Greek account, which also taught about the tribunals beneath the earth, or the Jewish account, which, among other things, also prophesied about the life that follows this present one, he would not be able to show that we, having fallen into misheard fragments

of the truth — at least those of us who try to believe with reason — live by such doctrines. He wants to compare the matters of our faith to the affairs of the Egyptians, among whom, for one approaching, there are splendid precincts and groves, and gateways magnificent in size and beauty, and marvelous temples, and stately pavilions all around, and rites full of superstition and mystery; but then, for one entering and

going further within, one finds a cat being worshipped, or perhaps an ape, a crocodile, a goat, or else a dog. For what among us corresponds to the things that appear so solemn to those approaching the Egyptians, and what corresponds to the irrational animals worshipped within, after the solemn gateways? Or are the prophecies and the God who is over all and the arguments against the images

solemn even by his own reckoning, while Jesus Christ crucified corresponds to the worshipped irrational animal? But if this is what he means (for I do not think he would say anything else), we will answer that more has been said above by us in support of the case concerning Jesus — that even the things which seem to have happened to him in a merely human way have proved useful for the universe as a whole and salutary for

the whole world. Then, as for the Egyptians' claims — when they speak solemnly even about the irrational animals and assert that they are certain symbols of God, or however their prophets who traffic in such things prefer to name them — he says that these send forth an impression to those who have learned about them, since their initiation has not, after all, been pointless; but as for the things in our own writings that arise from what is called by Paul the gift given "through

the Spirit" in the word of wisdom, and in "according to the Spirit" in the word of knowledge, which are presented to those well versed in learning within Christianity — Celsus seems to me not to have formed any impression of these at all, not only from these remarks but also from what he says next, when in accusing the Christian community he says that they drive away every wise person from the reasoning of their faith and admit only the foolish and the slavish

who are called, about which we shall learn in due course, when we come to that topic. And he says that we mock the Egyptians, even though they offer many riddles that are not trivial, when they teach that such things are honors paid to eternal forms and not, as most people suppose, to short-lived animals; and that we are foolish for introducing, in our

accounts about Jesus, nothing more dignified than the goats and dogs found among the Egyptians. To this too we shall reply: is it not so, my good man, that while you rightly praise the Egyptians for offering many riddles that are not trivial, and obscure accounts about the animals among them, you do wrong in accusing us, as though you were convinced that we say nothing worthwhile but everything without reason and cheap, when the matters concerning Jesus

we set forth according to the wisdom contained in the word, to those who are perfect, as it were, in Christianity. Concerning such people, as ones fit to hear the wisdom found in Christianity, Paul, teaching, says: "We speak wisdom among the perfect, a wisdom not of this age, nor of the rulers of this age, who are passing away; rather, it is God's wisdom we speak, hidden within a mystery, wisdom kept concealed, which

God foreordained before the ages for our glory, which none of the rulers of this age has known." And we say to those who share Celsus's opinion: was it then no surpassing wisdom that Paul had in view when he promised to speak "wisdom" "among the perfect"? And when, in keeping with his own rashness, he claims that Paul had nothing wise in mind when he made these promises, we shall answer him in turn, saying: first clarify

the letters of the man who says these things, and, having fixed your gaze on the intent of each expression in them — take, for instance, the letter to the Ephesians, and to the Colossians, and to the Thessalonians, and to the Philippians, and to the Romans. Show us both things: that you have understood Paul's words, and that you can point out certain foolish or silly points in them. For if he devotes himself to reading with attention, I know well

that he will either admire the man's mind, as it conceives great things in ordinary language, or, failing to admire it, he himself will appear ridiculous — whether recounting the matter as one who has understood the man's intent, or attempting to contradict and overturn what he merely imagined he had understood him to mean. And I am not yet speaking of the care shown in the Gospels regarding everything that is written, each item of which contains a meaning that is hard to discern in depth, not only

for the many but even for some of the intelligent — containing the deepest exposition of the parables which Jesus spoke to those "outside," while keeping their clarity for those who have gone beyond the outward hearing and come to him privately "in the house." He will marvel, once he understands, at what reason there is for some to be called "outside" while others are named as being "in the house." And once more, who would not

be astonished, among those able to perceive Jesus's transitions — going up a mountain for such words or deeds, or for his own transfiguration, while below he heals the sick and those unable to go up to where his disciples follow him? But to expound now the truly solemn and divine matters of the Gospels, or the Christ who is in Paul — that is, of the wisdom

and of the argument, this is not the moment to consider. But even this much is sufficient against Celsus's unphilosophical mockery, when he likens the inner and mystical things of God's church to the cats, monkeys, crocodiles, goats, or dogs of the Egyptians. Leaving no form of ridicule and derision against us untried, the buffoon Celsus in his treatise against us names the Dioscuri,

Heracles, Asclepius, and Dionysus — men whom the Greeks held to have risen from humanity into godhood. And he says that we cannot bear to consider these to be gods, on the ground that they were men, and men to begin with, even though they performed many noble deeds on behalf of humanity; whereas we say that Jesus, after dying, was seen by his own followers. He further charges us with saying that he was seen, and that this too was a mere shadow.

To this we shall reply that Celsus has terribly failed either to state clearly that he himself does not revere these figures as gods (for he was wary of the opinion of those who would encounter his writing, lest they suppose him godless, if he openly professed the view he himself held to be true), or, on the other hand, to pretend that he too considers them gods; for we would have answered him differently depending on which position he took. Come then, let us say this

to those who do not consider them to be gods. Do these figures not exist at all from the start, but rather — as some suppose concerning the human soul, that it perishes at once — has their soul likewise perished? Or, according to the view of those who say it persists, either as immortal or as persisting in some other way, do these persist, or are they immortal, and not gods but heroes?

Or perhaps not even heroes, but merely souls? Suppose, then, you hold that they do not exist — in that case we must set forth our own leading argument concerning the soul. But suppose they do exist; even so, the doctrine of immortality must be accepted, not only from those Greeks who have spoken well concerning it, but also according to what is agreeable to the divine teachings. And we shall show that it is not possible for these figures, having become gods among many,

to have come into a better place and portion after their departure from this life here, bringing with us the accounts written about them, in which is recorded much licentiousness on Heracles's part, and his womanish servitude to Omphale, and the story of Asclepius, how he was struck by his father Zeus with a thunderbolt. And we shall also speak of the Dioscuri, how at one time they live on alternate days, and at another time again they are dead;

and that these, who die again and again, have been allotted honor equal to the gods. How then, by reasonable account, do they suppose that any of these should be considered a god or a hero? But as for us, when we demonstrate the things concerning our own Jesus from the prophetic writings, and after this compare the history concerning him with the histories concerning those figures . . . . . that no licentiousness at all is reported of him. For not even

his own plotters, who sought "false testimony" against him, found even a plausible pretext for "false testimony" against him, by which they might accuse him on the ground of licentiousness; but even his death came about through a plot of men, and had nothing at all resembling the thunderbolt against Asclepius. And what gravity does the frenzied Dionysus possess, arrayed in a woman's attire, such that divine worship should be paid him? If

And if those who defend these matters take refuge in allegories, one must examine separately whether the allegories are sound, and separately whether they can have any substance and be worthy of reverence and worship — beings torn to pieces by Titans and cast down from the heavenly throne. But our Jesus, who appeared to his own initiates (for I will use the term found in Celsus),

was seen in truth, but Celsus slanders the account by saying he was seen as a shadow. Let the stories told about those others be examined alongside the one concerning Jesus. Or does Celsus want those to be true, while these — written down by people who had seen him and who by their very actions displayed the vividness of their perception of what they had witnessed, and made plain the disposition

in which they willingly suffered for the sake of his word — are to be fictions? And who, wishing to act reasonably in everything, would arbitrarily agree with the accounts about those others but, rushing unexamined toward the accounts about this one, disbelieve what is said about him? And again, whenever it is said about Asclepius that a great multitude of people, both Greeks and barbarians, admit that they have often seen him

and still see him — not a mere apparition, but one who heals and benefits and foretells the future — Celsus asks us to believe this and does not blame those who put their faith in these things. But when we, seeing the guilelessness of the disciples and eyewitnesses of Jesus' wonders — insofar as one can perceive conscience from writings — assent to them and to the fair-mindedness they clearly display in their own conscience,

we are called simpletons by Celsus, though he himself is unable to point to, in his own phrase, an innumerable host of Greeks and barbarians who acknowledge Asclepius. For we, if he counts this a mark of dignity, are able plainly to show an innumerable host, of both Greeks and barbarians, acknowledging Jesus. And some display signs of having received, through this faith, something rather beyond the ordinary,

in the healings they perform, calling upon nothing else over those in need of healing than the God over all and the name of Jesus together with the account concerning him. Indeed, through these very things we ourselves have witnessed many people delivered from grievous afflictions, derangements, madness, and countless other conditions, which neither men nor demons had healed. But in order also to grant that some healing demon called Asclepius

heals bodies, I would say to those who marvel at such a thing, or at the divination of Apollo, that if the medical treatment of bodies is a middling matter, one that falls not only to the refined but also to the base, and if foreknowledge of the future is likewise a middling matter (for foreknowledge by no means indicates refinement in the one who foreknows), then show us how those who heal or those who foreknow are in no way base

but are proved in every way to be refined, and not far from being supposed to be gods. Yet proving that those who heal or foretell are refined is something they will be unable to do, since many reputed to be healed are unworthy of life — persons whom even a wise physician would not have wished to treat, given how improperly they live. And in the oracles of the Pythian god

you would find some commands that are not reasonable. Of these I will set out two for the present: that he ordered Cleomedes—the boxer, I believe—to be honored with honors equal to a god's. I do not know what solemn thing he ever saw in his boxing, yet he honored neither Pythagoras nor Socrates with the honors of a boxer. But he also called Archilochus "a servant of the Muses"—a man who displayed his poetry in the basest and most licentious subject matter

and exhibited a licentious and impure character. Insofar as he was a "servant of the Muses," who are supposed to be goddesses, he pronounced him a pious man. I do not know whether even an ordinary person would say that the pious man is not adorned with every moderation and virtue, or whether a decent person would say the sorts of things contained in the not-so-solemn iambics of Archilochus. But if nothing

divine is evident on its own from the medical art of Asclepius and the prophetic art of Apollo, how could anyone reasonably—even granting that these things are so—worship them as gods who are in some sense pure? Especially since, through the Pythian aperture, as the so-called prophetess sits around it, the prophetic spirit enters through her female organs—Apollo, that is, the pure one, free from an earthly body! We hold nothing of the sort

about Jesus and his power. For the body which came to be from the virgin was made up of human substance, able to receive human wounds and death. Let us also look at what Celsus says after this, setting out marvels from histories that in themselves resemble things not to be believed, but that, at least as far as his own wording goes, he does not disbelieve.

And first, the account concerning Aristeas of Proconnesus, about whom he says this: then Aristeas of Proconnesus, who vanished from among men so demonically and again plainly appeared, and after a long time visited many places of the inhabited world and announced marvelous things, and whom Apollo commanded the people of Metapontum to honor as a share of the gods—this Aristeas no one

any longer regards as a god. He seems to have taken the story from Pindar and Herodotus. It suffices now to set out Herodotus's own wording, taken from Book Four of his Histories, running concerning him thus: "And I have said where Aristeas, who said these things, was from; but I will tell the account concerning him that I heard at Proconnesus and Cyzicus. For they say that Aristeas, being inferior to none of the citizens in birth,

went into a fuller's shop at Proconnesus and died; and the fuller, locking up his workshop, went off to tell those related to the dead man. And once word that Aristeas had perished was already circulating throughout the city, a man from Cyzicus, arriving from the city of Artace, came to dispute with those who said this, claiming that he had met him going toward Cyzicus and had come to speech with him. And

this man disputed the matter vehemently, while those related to the dead man came to the fuller's shop with what was needed, intending to carry him off; but when the room was opened, Aristeas appeared neither living nor dead. And afterward, in the seventh year, he appeared at Proconnesus and composed those verses which the Greeks now call the Arimaspeia, and having composed them he vanished a second time." This, then

These cities say this. But this is what I know happened to the people of Metapontum in Italy two hundred and forty years following Aristeas's second disappearance, a conclusion I reached by comparing the accounts at Proconnesus and at Metapontum. The Metapontines say that Aristeas himself appeared to them in their country and ordered them to set up an altar of Apollo and to place a statue beside it, inscribed with the name of Aristeas of Proconnesus. For he told them

that Apollo had come to their land alone among all the Italiotes, and that he himself—the one now known as Aristeas—had accompanied him; but at that time, when he was accompanying the god, he was a crow. Having said this, he vanished, and the Metapontines say that they sent to Delphi to ask the god the meaning of the man's apparition. The Pythia told them to obey

the apparition, and that if they obeyed it would be better for them. They accepted this and carried it out. And now there stands a statue bearing the name of Aristeas right beside the very image of Apollo, and around it are laurel trees; the image is set up in the marketplace. Let this much be said about Aristeas." Now, with regard to this account of Aristeas, it must be said that if Celsus

had set it forth simply as a piece of history, without showing his own assent to it, as though accepting it as true, we would have answered his argument differently. But since he says that Aristeas vanished by supernatural agency and then plainly reappeared, and had visited many parts of the inhabited world and announced marvels, and moreover an oracle of Apollo commanded the Metapontines to honor Aristeas with a share of divine rank, as

he sets this out on his own authority and with his own assent — [this is] the argument against him: how is it that, while supposing the extraordinary things written about Jesus by his disciples to be fabrications, and blaming those who believe them, you do not think these things to be either portents or fabrications? And how is it that, while accusing others of believing without reason the extraordinary things about Jesus, you yourself show that you have believed so many things,

bringing no proof or demonstration whatsoever that they actually happened? Or is it that Herodotus and Pindar are, in your judgment, considered free of falsehood, while those who practiced dying for the teachings of Jesus, and who left to those who followed them writings about the things of which they had been persuaded — things that are, as you suppose, about fabrications and myths and portents — struggle so hard for them that they even live under persecution and die violently for their sake?

Set yourself, then, in the middle between what has been written about Aristeas and what is recorded about Jesus, and see whether one may not say, from the outcome and from the benefit gained toward the correction of character and toward reverence for the God over all, that what is recorded about Jesus must be believed as not having come about apart from God, while what is recorded about Aristeas of Proconnesus

must not. For what did providence intend in bringing about the marvels concerning Aristeas, and what benefit did it intend for the human race in displaying, as you suppose, things of such magnitude? You cannot say. But we, when we recount the things concerning Jesus, do not offer just any ordinary defense for their having happened, namely that God willed to establish, through Jesus, [a way] as

the saving message for human beings — confirmed by the apostles as by foundations of the building of Christianity now being laid, and continuing to grow in the times that followed, in which not a few healings performed in Jesus's name, along with certain other epiphanies not to be despised, are still being accomplished. But what sort of thing is this Apollo, who charges the people of Metapontum to number Aristeas among the gods? And to what end does he do this,

and what benefit is he arranging to come to the Metapontines from the honor paid to him as to a god, if they should now reckon as a god a man who a little before was merely human? But if the pronouncements concerning Aristeas — from Apollo, that spirit of ours who has obtained as his prize "libation and burnt-fat savor" — seem to you worth taking seriously, while those concerning the God over all and his holy angels, delivered through

the prophets — not after Jesus had come to be, but foretold before he sojourned among the life of human beings — do not move you to marvel, neither at the prophets who received the divine spirit nor at the one prophesied by them? His sojourn into human life happened to be proclaimed, many years beforehand, through so many voices that the whole Jewish nation, hanging upon the expectation of the one

hoped for, who was to come, fell into disputing among themselves once Jesus had come; and a great multitude of them confessed Christ and came to believe that he was the one prophesied, while those who did not believe, scorning the gentleness of those who, because of Jesus's teachings, were unwilling to rebel even to the smallest degree, dared such things against Jesus as his disciples, in love of truth and fair-mindedness, recorded —

not concealing, from the paradoxical account concerning him, whatever seemed to most people to bring shame upon the word of the Christians. For Jesus himself wished, and so did his disciples, that those who came to him should believe not only in his divinity and his paradoxical deeds, as though he had not shared in human nature nor taken up the flesh that exists among human beings, which desires "against the spirit" — but rather

they saw that the power descending into human nature and into human circumstances, and taking up a human soul and a human body, was, through being believed in together with the more divine elements, contributing to the salvation of those who believe — seeing that from that point on the divine and the human nature began to be woven together, so that the human, through communion with what is more divine, might become divine — not in Jesus alone,

but also in all those who, along with believing, take up the life that Jesus taught, which leads up to friendship with God and to communion with him, for everyone whose life follows the precepts Jesus set down. Now the Apollo of Celsus wishes the people of Metapontum to number Aristeas among the gods. But since the Metapontines, having in view the manifest reality of Aristeas as a man

and perhaps not even a worthy one, considered it stronger evidence than the oracle concerning him, that he counted as a god or merited divine honors, and for this reason were unwilling to be persuaded by Apollo — and so no one thinks Aristeas a god. But concerning Jesus we would say that, since it was beneficial to the human race to receive him as the Son of God, God who had come in a human soul —

...and body, and this did not seem advantageous to the gluttony of the body-loving demons and of those who consider them to be gods. For this reason the demons on earth—regarded as gods by those uneducated about demons—[opposed the teaching]. But those who worship them also wished to hinder the spread of Jesus's teaching, for they saw the libations and the savory smoke of sacrifice, in which

they took gluttonous delight, being diminished as the teachings of Jesus gained mastery. But the God who sent Jesus, having dissolved every plot of the demons, brought it about that throughout the whole inhabited world, for the conversion and correction of humanity, the gospel of Jesus should prevail, and that everywhere there should arise churches set in opposition to the assemblies of the superstitious, the licentious, and the unjust—for such are the people who everywhere make up the citizenry

of the masses of the cities. But the churches of God that have been made disciples of Christ, when compared with the assemblies of the peoples among whom they dwell, are 'as lights' 'in the world.' For who could deny that even the worse members of the church—those who fall far short by comparison with the better—are nevertheless far superior to the assemblies found among the peoples? For the church of God, let us say, at Athens is a gentle

and stable one, since it wishes to please the God who is over all; but the assembly of the Athenians is factious and in no way comparable to the church of God there. You could say the same about the church of God in Corinth and the assembly of the people of Corinth, and, let us say, about the church of God in Alexandria and the assembly of the people of Alexandria.

And if the one who hears this is fair-minded and examines the matter with a love of truth, he will marvel at the one who both planned and was able to accomplish the founding, everywhere, of churches of God, dwelling alongside the assemblies of the peoples in each city. And likewise, setting the council of God's church side by side with the council belonging to each city, you would discover which of the church's councilors are truly worthy, if any such there be

anywhere in the whole world a city of God, to be citizens there; whereas the councilors found everywhere bear nothing in their own characters worthy of the superiority their rank seems to give them over the other citizens. And in like manner one ought to set the ruler of each city's church alongside the ruler of that same city's other inhabitants, so that you may perceive that even among the most disappointing councilors and rulers of the church of God

and those who live more carelessly than those who live more vigorously, one can nonetheless find, no less, a general superiority in progress toward the virtues over the characters of those who serve as councilors and rulers in the cities. And if this is so, how is it not reasonable to hold, concerning Jesus, who was able to accomplish so much, that no ordinary divinity was in him—no longer

in Aristeas of Proconnesus either, even if Apollo wishes to assign him a place among the gods, nor in those figures Celsus lists when he says that no one considers Abaris the Hyperborean a god, though he possessed such power as to travel borne along on an arrow. For what did the divinity that granted this to Abaris the Hyperborean intend in bestowing on him so great a gift—being borne along on an arrow—except that he might derive some benefit

...the race of mankind? Or what benefit did that man himself gain from being struck by an arrow? — even granting that these things are in no way fictions but came about through some cooperation of a divine power. But if my Jesus is said to be taken up 'in glory,' I see the design in this: that the God who brought this about commended the teacher to those who witnessed it, so that, as contending not for human teachings but for divine

teaching, they might devote themselves, insofar as their power allowed, to God who reigns over all things, and do everything for the sake of pleasing him, since they will receive, according to their merit, in the divine tribunal, whatever they have done well or badly in this life. Since after this Celsus also spoke about the man of Clazomenae, adding, following his own account of him: 'Do they not say this,

that his soul often left his body and wandered about incorporeal? And yet men did not consider even him a god.' And to this we shall say that perhaps certain wicked demons contrived to have such things recorded (for I do not think it was they who brought about the events themselves), so that the things prophesied concerning Jesus and the things said by him might either be discredited as fictions similar to those, or

as having nothing more than others, not be greatly admired. Now my Jesus spoke concerning his own soul—not as parting from the body by human necessity, but according to the extraordinary authority given to him in this matter as well—these words: 'It is not another who removes my soul from me—rather, I myself set it down of my own will. I have authority to lay it down, and again

I have authority to take it up.' For since he had 'authority to lay it down,' he laid it down when he said, 'Father, why have you forsaken me?' and 'having cried out with a loud voice, he gave up his spirit,' getting ahead of the executioners in charge of those impaled on the stake, who cut the legs of the crucified—and cut them for this reason, so that they might not suffer punishment any longer. And he took up 'his soul' again when he showed himself to the disciples,

having foretold this beforehand to the Jews who disbelieved him: 'Destroy this temple, and within three days I will have it raised up again.' And 'he said this about the temple of his body.' And the prophets had proclaimed this very thing in advance through many passages, and also through this one: 'Moreover, my flesh also will dwell in hope; for you will not abandon my soul to

Hades, nor will you allow your holy one to see corruption.' Celsus showed that he had read a great many Greek histories, citing also the story of Cleomedes of Astypalaea, whom he recounted as having descended into a chest, and, though caught inside it, was not found within, but had flown out beyond by some demonic dispensation, when certain people broke open the chest in order to seize him. And this, if

it is a fiction, as it does seem to be a fiction, is not comparable to what concerns Jesus, since in that man's case no token whatever of the reported divinity is found in the life of men, whereas in the case of Jesus there are the churches of those who have benefited, the prophecies spoken concerning him, the healings performed in his name, the knowledge accompanied by wisdom that comes through him, and

This is a rationale found among those who have taken care to rise above bare faith and to search out the meaning in the divine scriptures, following the counsel Jesus gave when he said, "Search the scriptures"; it likewise follows what Paul intended in teaching that each of us must know the proper way to give an answer to every person. But also of him who said: "always ready to give a defense to everyone who asks you

an account concerning the faith that is in you." But if he himself wishes it to be conceded that it is not a fabrication, let him say it. What purpose did the power beyond man have in making him fly out of the chest by some demonic fate? For if he can present something noteworthy, and a will of God worthy of having granted such a thing to Cleomedes, we shall judge what must be said to him; but if he will be at a loss even

to say something plausible on the matter, then clearly, to the extent that no rational account is found, we shall either join those who do not accept the story and charge it with being untrue, or we shall say that some demon, similar to those who by sorcery display deceptions of the eyes, did this also in the case of the man of Astypalaea, about whom Celsus thinks he uttered some divine oracle - that he flew off from the chest by some

demonic fate. Now I for my part think that Celsus knew only these examples, and, so that he might seem to be deliberately passing over similar ones, he said, "one could mention many other such cases." Well then, let it be granted and conceded that many more such cases occurred, which brought no benefit to the human race - what would each of these be found to amount to, compared with the work of Jesus

and the wonders concerning him, about which we have spoken at greater length? After this he thinks that we, who worship one who, as Celsus says, was captured and died, have done something similar to the Getae, who revere Zamolxis, the Cilicians, who revere Mopsus, the Acarnanians, who revere Amphilochus, the Thebans, who revere Amphiaraus, and the Lebadeans, who revere Trophonius. And on these points too we shall refute him for not reasonably

comparing us to those just mentioned. For those people built temples and statues for the figures they listed, whereas we, having stripped away honor of that kind from the divine - as being more fitting for demons, which have somehow settled in a given place, a place they either seize beforehand or, drawn by certain rites and sorceries, come to inhabit as if it were their home - we stand in awe of Jesus, who has turned our mind away from

everything perceptible to the senses, as being not only corruptible but destined for destruction, and who leads us, together with an upright life, up to the honor of the God over all, with prayers that we offer to him as one who stands between the nature of the unbegotten and the nature of all begotten things, who both brings us the benefits that come from the Father and conveys, in the manner of a high priest, our

prayers to the God over all. I should like to engage, in a manner fitting to him, in some such idle chatter with the man who says such things - I do not know how he says them - and ask: are these, then, whom you have listed, nothing at all? Is there no power at Lebadea connected with Trophonius, nor at Thebes around the temple of Amphiaraus, nor in Acarnania around Amphilochus, nor in Cilicia around

...Mopsus? Or is there among such figures either a daemon or a hero or even a god, accomplishing something greater than is possible for a human being? For if he says that there is nothing else, neither daemonic nor divine, connected with these figures, let him now at least confess his own opinion — since he is an Epicurean, and does not think the same things as the Greeks, and neither acknowledges daemons nor even worships gods as

the Greeks do, then let him be refuted for having pointlessly brought forward, as though accepting them as true, both what he said before and what he adduces in what follows. But if he says that those he has listed are either daemons or heroes or even gods, let him see that by what he has said he will establish the very thing he does not want — namely, that Jesus too was something of this kind, and that this is why he has been able to present himself

to no small number of people as having come down from God to the human race. But once he grants this, consider whether he will be compelled to admit that this being is stronger than those he has counted him among. For none of those others prevents the honors paid to different gods, whereas this one, confident in himself as more powerful than all of them, forbids the acceptance of honors paid to those others, as being wicked daemons who have seized beforehand places

"upon the earth — since they cannot lay hold of the purer and more divine region, where the coarsenesses that come from the earth and its countless evils do not reach. And since after this he also brings up the matter of Hadrian's favorite (I mean the affair of the youth Antinous and the honors paid to him by the people of Antinoöpolis in Egypt), thinking that it falls short in nothing

of the honor we pay to Jesus, come, let us refute this too, spoken as it is out of sheer hostility. For what has the life lived among Hadrian's favorites in common — a man who did not even keep his manhood free from a woman's disease — with our revered Jesus, whom not even those who have leveled countless accusations against him, saying whatever falsehoods they please about him, have been able to charge with even the slightest

taste of licentiousness, however small? But indeed, if one examined the matter of Antinous with love of truth and without partiality, one would find that the causes of his seeming to do something in Antinoöpolis even after his death were Egyptian trickeries and rites — a thing which is also recorded to have happened, by Egyptians and by others skilled in such matters, in connection with other temples, in certain places,

where they establish daemons of divination or of healing, and often also torment those who seem to have transgressed in some way regarding ordinary foods, or regarding the touching of a human corpse, so that they may seem to terrify the common, uneducated crowd. Such is also the one who has been reckoned a god in Antinoöpolis of Egypt, whose virtues some, living rather like gamblers, falsely claim, while others

are deceived by the daemon established there, and yet others, convicted by a weak conscience, suppose they are paying a penalty driven by God on account of Antinous. Such too are the mysteries performed for him, and the seeming oracles, from which the things concerning Jesus are very far removed. For it was not that sorcerers came together to do a favor for some king who commanded it or governor who ordered it, and so made him seem to be a god, but

The creator of all things himself, in keeping with the persuasive power that is wondrously effective in his speaking, established him as worthy of honor, not only to those human beings who are willing to think rightly, but also to demons and other invisible powers, who to this very day show either that they fear the name of Jesus as something greater than themselves, or that they accept it reverently as the name of one who rules according to their own laws. For if it were not

a constitution given to him from God, demons too would not, simply by yielding to his name when it is pronounced, withdraw from those whom they are attacking. Since the Egyptians were taught to worship Antinous, they will tolerate a comparison of Apollo or Zeus to him, for they glorify Antinous precisely by counting him among those gods; and here too Celsus is plainly lying when he says: even if you compare to him

Apollo or Zeus, they will not tolerate it. But Christians have learned that eternal life for them consists in knowing "the only true God over all" and "him whom" that God "sent, Jesus Christ," and they have also learned "that every god among the nations is but a demon," greedy for sacrifices and blood and for the

portions carried off from the sacrifices, wallowing in these things to deceive those who have not fled for refuge to the God over all things; while God's angels, holy and divine, differ in nature and purpose from every demon on earth, and are known to very few — only to those who have searched into such matters with intelligence and care. So that if you were to compare Apollo and Zeus, or any of those worshiped with the smoke of fat and

blood and sacrifices, to him, such people will not tolerate it — some because of their great simplicity, not knowing how to give an account of what they do, yet faithfully keeping what they have received; others with arguments that are not to be despised but are in fact quite profound and, as a Greek might put it, esoteric and belonging to the higher mysteries, in which there is much discussion of God and of those who have been honored by God

through the only-begotten God, the Word, by participation in deity, and for this reason honored in name as well. And there is much discussion too about the divine angels, and about those who stand against the truth yet have themselves been deceived, and who, led by that deception, proclaim themselves gods, or messengers of God, or benevolent demons, or heroes arising from the transformation of a virtuous human soul. Such beings

are Christians in truth — just as many in philosophy suppose themselves to be so in truth, having either beguiled themselves with persuasive arguments, or having rashly assented to arguments put forward and devised by others — so too there are, among the souls that exist apart from bodies, and among angels and demons, some who, drawn by such persuasive appearances, have proclaimed themselves gods. And because of such

arguments, which cannot be found among human beings in a wholly exact and precise form, it was judged safe to entrust oneself, being human, to no one as to a god, except to the one alone who presides over all as arbiter — Jesus Christ, who both contemplated these things most profoundly and handed them down to a few. Concerning Antinous, then, or anyone else of that kind, whether among the Egyptians or among the Greeks, there is belief,

so to call her, unlucky. But concerning Jesus she would either seem to be lucky, or she has been examined with rigorous scrutiny — seeming lucky to the many, but examined with rigorous scrutiny by a very small few indeed. And even if I grant that there is a kind of faith which the many would call "lucky," I refer the account of it back to the God who knows the causes of the things

apportioned to each person during his sojourn in life. The Greeks too will say, even among those reputed wisest, that in many respects good luck is the cause — for instance, in the matter of one's teachers and of encountering the better sort, since there are also those who teach the opposite schools of thought, and in the matter of an upbringing among better people. For many have had their upbringing amid such circumstances that

they were not even allowed to catch a glimpse of the better things, but were always, from their earliest years, either among licentious men as children, or under licentious masters, or hemmed in by some other misfortune that kept the soul from looking upward. The causes underlying these things surely belong, in all likelihood, among the discussions of providence, but they are not easy for human beings to grasp. It seemed to me

worth saying this in passing, as a digression, because faith of a certain kind, once it has taken prior hold, accomplishes so much. For it would have been necessary, on account of the differing upbringings, to point out the differences among the kinds of faith found among human beings — some believe more luckily, others less luckily — and from this to rise to the conclusion that even to the more astute, precisely in their seeming to be more rational, what is called good luck and what is

called bad luck would seem to cooperate in their assenting, for the most part, more rationally to doctrines. But enough on these matters. We must now turn our attention to what follows in Celsus. In this passage he says that faith produces in us — having taken prior hold of our soul — this sort of assent concerning Jesus. For faith does indeed truly produce in us such assent; but see whether faith itself does not, from the outset, present something praiseworthy, when we believe ourselves to

the God over all, acknowledging our gratitude to the one who guided us to such faith and declaring that he did not dare and accomplish so great a thing without God's help. And we believe also in the purposes of those who wrote the Gospels, judging by conjecture from their piety and their conscience, as displayed in their writings, that they had nothing spurious, deceitful, contrived, or unscrupulous about them. For indeed it is plain to us that

souls that had not learned such things as the unscrupulous sophistry taught among the Greeks — which possesses great persuasiveness and sharpness — and the rhetoric that wallows about in the law courts, could not have been capable of fabricating matters able, of themselves, to produce faith and a way of life corresponding to that faith. And I think that Jesus, for this very reason, chose to employ teachers

of his teaching who were of this sort, so that there might be no room for the suspicion of persuasive sophistries, but that it might shine forth clearly to those capable of understanding that the guilelessness of purpose in those who wrote — possessing, if I may put it this way, a great plainness — was deemed worthy of a more divine power, one accomplishing far more than an elaborate display of words, a composition of phrases, and a sequence following the divisions and technical artistry of Greek rhetoric seems able to accomplish. Consider

...unless the doctrines of our faith, which from the beginning agree with the common notions, transform those who listen to what is said with good will. For even if depravity has managed, with a great deal of instruction supporting it, to implant in the masses the notion about statues, that they are gods, and the notion about things fashioned from gold, silver, ivory, and stone, holding them worthy of worship — yet

the common notion demands that we understand that God is in no way corruptible matter, nor is he honored when he is shaped by human beings in lifeless materials, as if these were made "in his image" or as certain symbols of him. That is why it is immediately said of statues, "that they are not gods," — and regarding such manufactured things, that they are not comparable to the Creator, and a little is said about the God

over all things, who created and sustains and governs the universe. And immediately, as if recognizing its own kin, the rational soul casts away what until then it had supposed to be gods, and takes up a natural affection toward its Creator, and because of that affection for him it also warmly receives the one who first set these things before all the nations through the disciples whom he formed, whom he sent out with divine

power and authority to proclaim the message concerning God and his kingdom. Since he accuses us — I do not know how many times by now — concerning Jesus, that we consider one who came from a mortal body to be God, and that in doing this we suppose we are acting piously, it is superfluous to say more on this point, for a great deal has already been said above; nevertheless let those who bring the accusation know

this: the one whom we suppose and have been convinced from the beginning to be God and Son of God, he is the very Word himself and Wisdom itself and Truth itself; but as for his mortal body and the human soul within it, we say that through not only fellowship with him but also union and intermingling with him, it received the greatest gifts, and having shared in his divinity, was changed

into God. And if anyone takes offense at our saying this about his body as well, let him attend to what the Greeks say about matter, which in its own account is without quality, and receives whatever qualities the Creator wishes to place upon it, and often lays aside its former qualities and takes on better and different ones. For if such things are sound, what is astonishing about the quality of the mortal

body in the case of Jesus being changed, by the providence and will of God, into an ethereal and divine quality? Now Celsus did not speak as a dialectician when he set the human flesh of Jesus alongside gold, silver, and stone, claiming it is more corruptible than they are. For according to strict reasoning, neither is the incorruptible more incorruptible than the incorruptible, nor the corruptible more corruptible than the corruptible. But even if it were, in fact, more corruptible, nevertheless

we shall say this in reply as well: if it is possible for the matter that underlies all qualities to exchange its qualities, how is it not also possible for the flesh of Jesus, having exchanged its qualities, to have become such as it needed to be in order to dwell among the ether and the realms above it, no longer having the properties peculiar to fleshly weakness, which Celsus called more defiled? This too is not spoken philosophically

...doing this. For what is properly defiled comes from vice; such is its nature. But the nature of body is not defiled, for it is not insofar as it is the nature of body that it possesses the source that generates defilement, but rather vice does. Then, since, suspecting our defense concerning the transformation of his body, he says, "But then, having put these aside, he will be a god" -- why then not rather Asclepius and

Dionysus and Heracles? We will say: what so great a thing did Asclepius or Dionysus or Heracles accomplish? And what people will they be able to point to who were improved in character and became better because of their teachings and their manner of life, such that they should become gods? For after reading the many stories told about them, let us see whether they kept themselves free of self-indulgence, wrongdoing, folly, or cowardice. And should nothing of that kind be found,

of this sort were found in them, Celsus' argument would be strong in placing the men just mentioned on equal footing with Jesus. But if it is clear -- even granting that something more favorable is reported about them -- that they are recorded as having done countless things contrary to right reason, how then will you still say with any reason that it is more likely they, rather than Jesus, became gods by putting off the mortal body? After this he says about us

that we mock those who worship Zeus, since his tomb is shown in Crete, and yet we no less worship the one who came from a tomb -- not knowing how and in what sense the Cretans do this. Observe, then, that in these remarks he is defending the Cretans and Zeus and his tomb, hinting at figurative meanings according to which the myth about

Zeus is said to have been composed; but he accuses us, who confess that our Jesus was buried and also assert that he was raised up from the tomb -- something the Cretans no longer relate concerning Zeus. Since he appears to be speaking in defense of the tomb of Zeus in Crete, saying that he does not know how and in what sense the Cretans do this, we shall say that even Callimachus of Cyrene, who read a great many

poems and gathered together almost the whole of Greek history, knows of no allegorical interpretation regarding Zeus and his tomb. That is why he even reproaches the Cretans in the hymn he wrote to Zeus, saying: "Cretans are always liars; for indeed a tomb, O lord, the Cretans built for you -- but you did not die, for you are forever." And the one who said, "You

did not die, for you are forever," having denied the burial of Zeus in Crete, nonetheless relates that the beginning of death occurred with respect to Zeus. And the beginning of death is birth upon the earth; for he says as follows: "and it was in Parrhasia that Rhea bore you, after lying with him." He ought, since he denied the birth of Zeus in Crete because of his tomb, to have seen that

the dying of the one who was born followed upon his birth in Arcadia as well. Callimachus says such things also about these matters: "Zeus, some say you were born among the mountains of Ida; Zeus, others say in Arcadia. Which, father, were the liars? 'Cretans are always liars' -- " and so on. It is to these matters that Celsus has led us, being unfair toward Jesus while at the same time agreeing

the written accounts, that he died and was buried, while regarding as fiction that he also rose from the dead — and this despite countless prophets having foretold this very thing, and there being many signs of his appearance after death. Next after this Celsus brings forward the things said by a very few who are considered Christians, not the more sensible ones, as he supposes, but the most uneducated,

and he says such things are prescribed by them: "let no one educated approach, no one wise, no one sensible; for these qualities are regarded among us as evils. But if anyone is uneducated, if anyone is foolish, if anyone is untaught, if anyone is a simpleton, let him come with confidence." By openly acknowledging that such people are worthy of their god, they make it clear that it is only the stupid, the ignoble, the senseless, slaves,

little women, and children whom they wish to persuade, and are able to. To this we reply: just as if someone, when Jesus was teaching about self-control and saying, "whoever looks upon a woman with desire for her has, in his heart, already made her an adulteress," were to observe that a few out of so many who are considered Christians live licentiously, he would most reasonably be bringing an accusation against them

because their lives go against what Jesus taught, yet he would be acting quite unreasonably if he attached the charge against them to the teaching itself — so likewise, if it is found that the Christian doctrine is, no less than any other, one that summons people to wisdom, then the charge must fall upon those who plead for their own ignorance and say — not the things Celsus has recorded (for not even the uneducated and unlettered, however uncultivated some of them may be, would speak so shamelessly),

but other, far lesser things, which discourage the pursuit of wisdom. That the doctrine wishes us to be wise must be shown both from the ancient Jewish writings, which we too make use of, and no less from the writings composed after Jesus and believed in the churches to be divine. It is written, then, in the fiftieth psalm, where David says in his prayer

to God: "the hidden and secret things of your wisdom you have made known to me." And if anyone were to read through the psalms, he would find the book full of many wise teachings. Solomon too, since he asked for wisdom, was granted it; and traces of his wisdom can be seen in his writings, which contain great depth of thought in brief compass. In them

you would find many praises of wisdom and exhortations to acquire wisdom. And Solomon possessed such wisdom that, upon hearing of "his fame" "and the fame of the Lord," the queen of Sheba journeyed "to try him with hard questions." She "told him everything that was on her mind, and Solomon gave answer to all her inquiries;

there was no matter hidden from the king that he did not explain to her. And Sheba's queen observed every bit of Solomon's wisdom" and all that concerned him: "and she was overcome with amazement, and to the king she declared: what I heard in my own country concerning you and your wisdom proves true; and those who spoke of it to me, I did not believe, until

I came and my eyes have seen it, and behold, it is not as they reported to me — the half was not told. You have surpassed, with wisdom and good things, everything I had heard reported." Concerning this same man it stands written that "the LORD gave Solomon understanding and exceedingly great wisdom, and breadth of heart like the sand that is by the sea. And Solomon's wisdom increased

very greatly, surpassing the understanding of all the men of old and outstripping every sage of Egypt in wisdom. He proved wiser than every man alive, wiser than Gethan the Ezarite, than Emad, Chalkad, and Arada, sons of Mad; and his name was known throughout all the nations round about. Solomon uttered three thousand parables, while his songs numbered five thousand. Furthermore he spoke

concerning trees, beginning with the cedar found in Lebanon and extending to the hyssop springing from the wall. And he spoke concerning fish and cattle; and all the peoples came to hear the wisdom of Solomon, as did all the kings of the earth who heard of his wisdom." This, then, is how the Word wishes the faithful to be wise —

so much so that, in order to train the perception of those who heard him, he spoke certain things in riddles, certain things in what are termed "obscure sayings," certain things through parables, and yet others by means of problems set for solving. And indeed Hosea, one of the prophets, declares near the close of his own utterance: "Who is wise enough to understand these things? Who has the insight to know them?" As for Daniel

and those taken captive along with him advanced so greatly, even in the studies which the king's wise men in Babylon pursued, that they proved to surpass all of them "tenfold." And it is also said in Ezekiel, to the ruler of Tyre, who thought highly of himself for his wisdom: "Are you wiser than Daniel? Has nothing hidden been disclosed to you?" But if

you go on to the books written after Jesus, you will find the crowds of believers listening to the parables as people who are outsiders and worthy only of the outward teachings, while the disciples learn the explanations of the parables privately; for "privately" Jesus "explained everything to his own disciples," preferring, above the crowds, those who laid claim to his wisdom.

To those who believe in him he pledges that he will dispatch "sages and scribes," declaring: "Behold, I am sending among you sages and scribes; some of these they shall kill and crucify." And Paul likewise, in cataloguing the gifts bestowed by God, ranked the word of wisdom in the first place, and, as ranking beneath it, set in second place the word

of knowledge, and third, somewhere further down, faith. And since he valued reasoned speech above the wonder-working powers, for this reason he places "workings of powers" and "gifts of healings" in a lower rank than the gifts of reason. And Stephen, in the Acts of the Apostles, testifies to the broad learning of Moses, having drawn this entirely from ancient writings not accessible to many.

For he says: "And Moses was educated in the whole wisdom of the Egyptians." And for this reason, in the case of the miraculous acts too, it was suspected that perhaps he was not performing them according to the promise of having come from God, but according to the teachings of the Egyptians, since he was wise in them. For with such suspicions about him, the king summoned the enchanters of the Egyptians, and the sophists, and the sorcerers,

who were exposed as amounting to nothing in comparison with the wisdom in Moses, which surpassed all the wisdom of the Egyptians. But it is likely that what is written in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, addressed as it is to Greeks who greatly prided themselves on Greek wisdom, has stirred up some people, as though the word did not want people to be wise. But let the one who thinks such things hear this: just as,

in denouncing base men, the word says that they are not wise concerning intelligible, invisible, and eternal things, but have occupied themselves only with things perceptible to the senses, and, positing all things among these, are wise of this world; so too, since there are many doctrines, some champion matter and bodies, declaring that bodies are the primary existing things and that there is nothing else besides these,

whether it be called invisible or named incorporeal, he says this is "the wisdom of the world" that is being nullified and rendered foolish, and the wisdom of this age; while other doctrines, which transfer the soul from the affairs here to the blessedness that is with God and to what he calls his kingdom, and which teach one to hold in contempt everything perceptible and visible, as being merely temporary, but to press on toward the invisible and

to fix one's gaze on what is not seen—these he calls "the wisdom of God." And Paul, being a lover of truth, speaks concerning certain wise men among the Greeks, in the matters where they speak truly, saying, "that, having known God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks." And he testifies that they had known God; and he further says that this did not come about in them apart from God, where he writes, "for God made it manifest to them."

hinting, I think, at those who ascend from things seen to things understood, when he writes that "God's unseen nature, ever since the world was made, has been perceived and clearly known through the things he fashioned—his everlasting power and deity alike—leaving them without excuse, since, though they knew God, they did not honor him as God nor render him thanks." And perhaps also from "consider your calling,

brothers, that not many of you were wise according to the flesh, not many powerful, not many well-born; yet the foolish things of the world were chosen by God, to put the wise to shame, and the base and despised things of the world—the things that are not—God chose, to bring to nothing the things that are, so that no flesh should boast in his presence"—some people have been moved to suppose

that no one educated, or wise, or prudent approaches the word. But to such a person we shall reply that it is not said that no one is wise "according to the flesh," but "not many wise according to the flesh." And it is clear that, in describing the defining traits of those called bishops—what kind of person a bishop must be—Paul also included the teacher, saying that he must be

able "also to refute those who contradict," so that he may silence the idle talkers and deceivers by the wisdom within him. And just as it chooses the man married once rather than the man married twice for the office of overseer, and "blameless" rather than one open to reproach, and "sober" rather than one who is not, and "self-controlled" rather than one who is not self-controlled, and "orderly" rather than one who is even slightly disorderly, so it wishes the man who is going to be appointed to the office of overseer, first and foremost, to be able to teach and

able "to refute those who contradict." How then can Celsus reasonably charge us with saying: let no one educated approach, let no wise man approach, let no sensible man approach? On the contrary, let the educated, the wise, and the sensible man approach if he wishes; but no less let anyone approach who is uneducated, unintelligent, untrained, and simple. For the word promises to heal such people too when they come to it,

making all of them worthy of God. It is also false that those who teach the divine word wish to persuade only the foolish, the ignoble, the senseless, slaves, women, and children. For the word summons these people as well, so as to improve them; yet it likewise summons others who far surpass them, since Christ "is the savior of all people," and "especially of believers,"

whether they are intelligent or simpler folk, and he "is a propitiation" "before the Father" "for our sins, and not only for ours but also for those of the whole world." It is therefore excessive to wish, after this, to defend ourselves against Celsus's words, which run as follows: for what else is bad about being educated and having attended to the finest teachings and being, or appearing to be,

prudent? What does this hinder toward knowing God? Is it not rather advantageous, and a means by which one might better attain truth? Now, being truly educated is not a bad thing, for education is a road toward virtue; but as for counting among the educated those who hold mistaken beliefs, not even the wise men of the Greeks would say that. Again,

who in turn would not agree that attending to the finest teachings is good? But what shall we call the finest teachings, if not those that are true and that summon one to virtue? And being prudent is indeed a fine thing, but not merely appearing to be so, which is what Celsus said. And being educated does not hinder one from knowing God but rather helps toward it, as does

attending to the finest teachings and being prudent. And it is more fitting for us to say this than for Celsus, especially since he stands convicted of being an Epicurean. Let us now look at what he says next, which runs as follows: but we see, I think, that even those who display the most vulgar tricks in the marketplaces and go about gathering crowds would never come forward into an assembly of prudent men, nor would they dare to display their own

tricks among such people. But wherever they see young boys, a crowd of household slaves, and a throng of senseless people, there they push their way in and show off. Observe here too the manner in which he slanders us, likening us to those who display the most vulgar tricks in the marketplaces and gather crowds. What vulgar tricks, pray, do we display? Or what do we do resembling these people, we who through readings and through

for the readings of narratives, urging them toward piety toward the God of all things and the virtues that share its throne, and turning them away from contempt for the divine and from everything done contrary to right reason; and philosophers too would pray to gather so many hearers of speeches urging toward the good — which some of the Cynics especially have done, publicly

conversing with those who happen to be present. Will they then say that these too — who do not gather together those reputed to be educated, but call people in from the crossroads and gather hearers — are similar to those who display the most scandalous things in the marketplaces and collect crowds? But neither Celsus nor anyone who shares his views finds fault with those who, out of what appears to them to be philanthropy, stir up discourses even before the common

populace. But if those men are not culpable for doing this, let us see whether Christians are not rather summoning the multitudes to nobility of character even better than these do. Public-lecturing philosophers, after all, do not screen their hearers, but whoever wishes stands and listens; whereas Christians, so far as lies within their power, first put to the test the souls of would-be hearers, instructing them beforehand in private, and once

the hearers seem to have made sufficient progress toward wanting to live well, before entering the common assembly — at that point they bring them in, having formed privately one order of those just beginning and being introduced, who have not yet taken up the token of having been purified, and another order of those who have shown, so far as possible, that their purpose is to want nothing other than what Christians hold. Among

them there are certain persons appointed to inquire closely into the lives and conduct of those who approach, so that they may keep those who do shameful things from coming to their common assembly, while welcoming with their whole soul those who are not such, and making them better day by day. And what sort of treatment they give to sinners, and especially to the licentious, whom the followers of

Celsus, similar to those who display the most scandalous things in the marketplaces, expel from the community — is this: whereas the solemn school of the Pythagoreans used to set up empty tombs for those who abandoned their philosophy, reckoning that they had become dead men, these people instead mourn as dead, as though lost to God, those who have been overcome by licentiousness or some other outrageous thing. And as raised from the dead, if they show a notable change,

they admit them back, at some later point, after a longer time than those first introduced; assigning to no office or leadership in the so-called church of God those who, after having come to the word, have previously stumbled. Now observe next what is said by Celsus: we see, I suppose, that even those who display the most scandalous things in the marketplaces and collect crowds — unless this is flatly falsely stated and

compared in a way that does not fit. These men, then, to whom Celsus likens us — to those who display the most scandalous things in the marketplaces and gather crowds — he says would never pass into an assembly of sensible men, nor dare to display their wares among them, but that wherever they see young boys, a crowd of household slaves, and a throng of foolish people, there they push their way in and show off, and in doing so

doing nothing other than reviling us, in the manner of women at the crossroads whose aim is to speak evil of one another. For we, to the extent of our power, do everything for the sake of making our assembly one of prudent men, and only once our audience of discerning listeners has grown ample do we dare to bring forward, in our discussions before the community, the things among us that are most beautiful and divine;

but we hide and pass over in silence the deeper matters (whenever we observe that those who come together are rather simple people and need what is figuratively called "milk." For it is written in our Paul, writing to the Corinthians, who were Greeks but not yet purified in their characters: "I gave you milk to drink, not solid food; for you were not yet able. But not even now are you able, for you are still fleshly. For where there is among you jealousy

and strife, are you not fleshly and walking according to man?" This same man, knowing that some food belongs to the more perfect soul, while the food of those being introduced is compared to the milk of infants, says: "and you have come to have need of milk, not solid food. For everyone who partakes of milk has no experience of the reasoned word of uprightness, for he is an infant; but solid food belongs to the perfect,

to those who, through habit, have their perceptive faculties trained for the discernment of good and evil." Would those, then, who trust these words as well spoken suppose that the beautiful things of the discourse would never be spoken to an assembly of prudent men, but that wherever they see young lads and a crowd of household slaves and a company of foolish people, there they would bring the divine and solemn things forward

and preen themselves over such matters before people of that sort? But it is clear to anyone who examines the whole intent of our writings that Celsus, hating the Christian race just as he does the uneducated masses, says such things without examination and falsely. We confess that we want to educate everyone by the word of God, whether Celsus wishes it or not, so as to impart even to young lads the exhortation suited to them,

and to show household slaves as well how, by taking up a free mind, they might be ennobled by reason. And those among us who champion Christianity readily declare themselves obligated "to Greeks and barbarians, to the wise and the foolish"; for they do not deny that the souls even of the foolish must be tended, so that, laying aside ignorance to the extent of their power, they may hasten toward greater understanding, hearing also Solomon saying: "You

who are foolish, take heart to yourselves"; and: "whoever among you is most foolish, let him turn aside to me; and to those lacking sense wisdom urges, saying: 'Come, eat my bread and drink the wine I have mixed for you; leave behind foolishness, that you may live, and set your understanding right in knowledge.'" I would say this too, on account of the matters bearing on Celsus's argument: do not those who philosophize invite

young lads to their lectures? And do they not summon young people from the worst manner of life toward better things? And why should they not want household slaves to philosophize? Or are we going to blame philosophers for exhorting household slaves toward virtue—Pythagoras for exhorting Zamolxis, Zeno for exhorting Persaeus, and, just yesterday and the day before, those who exhorted Epictetus toward philosophy? Or is it, O Greeks, that for you

It is permitted to call young boys and household slaves and foolish people to philosophy; and when we do this, we are not acting without love for humanity, since we wish to heal every rational nature by the medicine that comes from reason, and to make it akin to the God who fashioned all things. This much would have sufficed as an answer to Celsus's abuse rather than accusation. But since, taking pleasure in his speech of abuse against us,

he added still more, come, let us set these things out too and see whether it is the Christians who behave shamefully, or Celsus, in what he says. He writes: We see, indeed, that in private houses wool-workers, cobblers, and washermen, and the most uneducated and rustic people, dare say nothing in front of their elders and more sensible masters; but once they get the children alone, along with a few foolish little women,

they pour out astonishing things, saying that one should not pay attention to one's father and teachers, but obey them instead; and that the former talk nonsense and are out of their minds, and in truth know nothing good and are capable of doing nothing good, being preoccupied with empty chatter, while only they themselves understand how life should be lived, and that happiness awaits the children if they yield to them

and will make their household blessed. And as they say this, if they see one of the teachers of learning approaching, or one of the more sensible people, or even the father himself, the more cautious among them grow frightened, while the bolder ones incite the children to unruliness, whispering such things as that, with the father and the teachers present, they themselves will neither wish nor be able to explain anything good to the children,

for they shrink from the folly and boorishness of those men, who are utterly corrupted and gone far in wickedness, and who punish them; but if the children are willing, they must leave their father and their teachers and go off with the little women and the children who play with them, to the women's quarters, or the cobbler's shop, or the fuller's shop, so that they may attain perfection. And by saying such things they persuade them. Now observe

in this too the manner in which he mocks those among us who teach the word and who try in every way to lead the soul up to the maker of all things, showing also that one must despise all sensible, temporary, and visible things, and do everything for the sake of attaining fellowship with God and the contemplation of things intelligible and invisible, and of the

blessed way of life with God and those who belong to God; he compares them to the wool-workers and cobblers and fullers found in households, and to the most rustic of men, who entice utterly infant children and little women toward base things, so that they may abandon father and teachers and follow them instead. Let Celsus show and set side by side, from what father possessed of sound sense, or from what teachers who taught more dignified things, do we draw away

the children and the little women; let him compare, among those who come to our teaching, children and women, whether any of the things they used to hear were better than ours, and in what way, by drawing children and little women away from certain fine and dignified studies, we entice them toward worse things. Yet nothing of the sort will he be able to prove against us; the little women, quite to the contrary,

We keep them away from licentiousness and the corruption that comes from their companions, and from all theater-madness and dance-madness and superstition. And the boys who are just reaching puberty and swelling with desire for sexual pleasures we bring to their senses, setting before them not only the shame in what is done wrong but also what the soul of the base will become because of such things, and what penalties it will pay and how it will be punished.

Which teachers do we say are foolish and deranged, on whose behalf Celsus takes his stand as though they taught the better things? Unless, that is, he thinks it fine teachers of little women, and not foolish, who call people to superstition and to licentious spectacles, and further that those who lead and drag the young into everything disorderly that we know is done by them in many places are not deranged.

We, then, so far as we are able, also call those who hold to the doctrines of the philosophers to our reverence for God, presenting its distinctive and unmixed character. But since, by what he was saying, Celsus made it appear that we do not do this but call only the foolish, we would say to him: if you were accusing us of turning away from philosophy those who

were already committed to it beforehand, you would not be speaking the truth, but your argument would have had some plausibility. But as it is, when you say we turn those approaching good teachers away from them, point to teachers apart from those who teach philosophy, or from men who have achieved something useful in some field. But you will have nothing of the kind to show. We promise that those will be blessed, openly and not in secret,

who shape their lives by the word of God, keeping him in view in everything, and doing whatever they do as though before God, the one who beholds them. Are these, then, lessons fit for wool-workers and cobblers and fullers and the most uneducated country folk? But this he will not be able to show. Those who side with Celsus are like the wool-workers found in households, and similar also to

cobblers and fullers and the most uneducated country folk, who, he says, in the presence of father and teachers will neither wish nor be able to interpret anything good to the children. To this too we shall reply: what sort of father, my good man, and what sort of teacher do you mean? If it is one who welcomes virtue and turns away from vice and embraces the better things, hear that we shall speak our teachings to the children very boldly indeed, as men held in good repute before

a judge of that kind. Yet if we keep silent when a father famed for virtue and nobility of character is present—and likewise before those who teach the opposite of sound reasoning—do not hold this against us either, for you have no good ground to accuse us of it: you yourself, at any rate, hand over the mysteries of philosophy to the young, to sons whose fathers consider philosophy an idle and useless pursuit, and you do not

speak of it before the base fathers themselves; rather, wishing to separate the sons who have been drawn toward philosophy from their wretched fathers, you watch for opportunities so that the arguments of philosophy may reach the young. And about teachers we will say the same things: for if we turn people away from teachers who teach the indecent parts of comedy and the licentious iambic verses and whatever else does not benefit the one speaking it

does not benefit its hearers when they do not know how to listen to poems philosophically and to select, for each of them, what contributes to the benefit of the young — in doing this we are not ashamed to admit what is done. But if you can present to me teachers who give preliminary instruction toward philosophy and who train people in philosophy, I will not turn the young away from them; rather, once they have been given this preliminary training, as in the general course of studies, and in the

philosophical disciplines, I will try to raise them up to the solemn and lofty grandeur of the Christians' eloquence, which has escaped the notice of the many, as they discuss and demonstrate and show, concerning the greatest and most necessary matters, that these very things have received philosophical treatment among God's prophets and among the apostles who followed Jesus. Then, after this, Celsus, sensing that he has reviled us rather bitterly, says the following as though defending himself: that I bring no charge more bitter than

the truth itself compels — let this too serve someone as evidence. Those who call people to the other mystery rites make proclamations of this sort beforehand: "Whoever has clean hands and an intelligible voice," and again others: "Whoever is unstained by any defilement, whose spirit carries the burden of no wrongdoing, and whose life has been conducted rightly and with justice." Such are the proclamations made in advance by those pledging to cleanse people of their sins. Let us now attend to

whom these people call instead. "Whoever," they say, "is a sinner, whoever is without understanding, whoever is a child, and, simply put, whoever is unfortunate — this one the kingdom of God will receive." Is that not what you mean by "sinner" — the unjust man, the thief, the housebreaker, the poisoner, the temple-robber, the grave-robber? Whom else would a bandit call, if he were making a proclamation? And to this we reply that it is not the same thing

to call those who are sick in soul to treatment as it is to call those who are healthy to the knowledge and understanding of more divine matters. And we, aware of both of these, at the outset issue an invitation aimed at the healing of people: we urge sinners to come to those who teach words that keep one from sinning, the unintelligent to those who produce understanding in them, and children to rise in their thinking

to the stature of a grown man, and the simply unfortunate to happiness — or, to put it more properly, to blessedness. Then, when those among the ones so urged who make progress demonstrate that the word has purified them and that they have, so far as possible, lived a better life, at that point we invite them to our own rites. For "we speak wisdom among the perfect." And, teaching "that wisdom will not enter

a soul devised for evil, nor dwell in a body enslaved to sin," this is our claim: let the one whose hands are clean, and who therefore raises "holy hands" to God and, besides performing lofty and heavenly deeds, can declare, "my uplifted hands are an evening offering," come forward to join us; and let the one whose voice shows understanding, gained by pondering the Lord's law "night and day," and by having his senses trained through practice

"for the discernment of good and evil," let him not hesitate to approach solid, rational food, fitting for athletes of piety and of every virtue; since "the grace" of God likewise rests "with all those who love, in incorruption," the teacher of the teachings of immortality — whoever is pure not merely from every defilement but also from the lesser

of what are reckoned as sins, let him confidently be initiated into the mysteries of the worship of God according to Jesus, which are reasonably entrusted only to the holy and pure. Now Celsus's mystagogue says: "Let him come whose soul is conscious of no evil"; but the one who initiates people according to Jesus will say to those whose soul has been purified: "Let him come whose soul has been conscious of no evil for a long time, and especially since he came forward"

to the therapy of the word. Let this person also hear the things spoken privately by Jesus to his genuine disciples. So then, even where he sets side by side the practices of the Greek initiators with the teachers of Jesus's teaching, he does not know the difference between those who are summoned for the healing of the wicked and those who are summoned to the more mystical teachings, being already among the purest. It is not, then, to mysteries and a sharing of wisdom "in

a mystery," hidden away, "which God foreordained before the ages for the glory" of his righteous ones, that we summon the unjust man, the thief, the housebreaker, the poisoner, the temple-robber, the grave-robber, and whatever other names Celsus, exaggerating the matter, might apply, but we summon them to healing. For in the divinity of the word there are, on the one hand, remedies that heal those who are "sick," concerning whom

the word said: "Those who are strong have no need of a physician, but those who are sick." And on the other hand, there are other teachings that display to those who are pure in soul and body "the revelation of the mystery kept silent for eternal ages but now made manifest, both through the prophetic writings" and through "the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ," appearing to each of the perfect and illuminating, for a true knowledge of the realities, the

guiding faculty. But since, exaggerating the charges against us, he adds to the names he called us among the most polluted of men the question: whom else did the herald, when proclaiming beforehand, call a robber? To this too we shall reply that he calls such people robbers, making use of their wickedness against men whom he wishes to murder and plunder; but the Christian, even if he calls those whom the robber calls, calls them by a different summons, so that he may

bind up "their wounds" with the word, and pour upon the soul inflamed by evils the medicines that come from the word, corresponding to the wine and oil and poultice and the rest of the remedies used for the healing of the soul. Then, misrepresenting the things said and written for the sake of exhortation toward those who have lived wickedly, and which call them to repentance and the correction of their soul, he says that we

say that God has been sent to sinners. And he does the same sort of thing as if he were to bring a charge against those who say that, on account of those living wickedly in the city, a physician was sent by a most benevolent king. God the Word, then, was sent as physician to sinners, but as instructor in sacred mysteries to those already purified and no longer sinning. But Celsus, unable

to distinguish these things (for he had no wish to learn), says: "But why was he not sent to those without sin? What harm is there in not having sinned?" To this we reply that if by "those without sin" he means those who no longer sin, our Savior Jesus was sent to these as well, but not as a physician; but if he means those who have never sinned at all (for he did not make this distinction in his own wording), we shall say

that it is impossible for a human being to be sinless in this way, but we say this while excepting the human being conceived of in reference to Jesus, "who committed no sin." Celsus speaks maliciously about us here, as though we said that if the unjust man humbles himself on account of his wickedness, God will receive him, but the just man, if from the beginning he looks upward toward him with virtue, this man

God will not receive—for we say it is impossible for a human being to look upward toward God from the beginning with virtue; for wickedness must necessarily first arise in human beings, as Paul also says: "but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life, and I died." But neither do we teach concerning the unjust man that it is sufficient for him, on account of his wickedness, to humble himself so as to

be received by God; rather, if he proceeds by condemning himself for his former deeds, being "humble" with respect to those, and "adorned" with respect to the latter, this is the man God will receive. Then, not understanding how it is said, "everyone who exalts himself will be humbled," nor even having learned from Plato that the noble and good man proceeds "humble and adorned," not knowing

this either—as we say: "be humbled, then, beneath God's mighty hand, so that in due season he may raise you up"—he says that men who preside rightly over justice silence with wailing speeches those who lament over their wrongdoings, so that they may not be judged with a view to pity rather than to truth; but God, it seems, judges not with a view to truth but to flattery. For what flattery,

and what sort of wailing speech is found, according to the sacred writings, when one who has sinned addresses God in prayer, saying: "I made known my sin, and my iniquity I did not hide; I said, I will confess against myself my iniquity to the Lord," and so on? But can he show that such a thing is not conducive to the turning of sinners, who humble themselves before God

in their prayers? And thrown into confusion by his impulse to accuse, he contradicts himself, at one point implying that he knows of a sinless and just man who looks upward toward God from the beginning with virtue, and at another accepting what is said by us, that "what man is perfectly just, or who is sinless?"—for as though accepting this he says: this indeed is fairly true,

that the human race is by nature somehow disposed to sin; then, as if not all are called by the Word, he says: they ought therefore simply to call everyone. If indeed all sin—and we showed above that Jesus said: "come to me, all who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest." All humans, then, are termed "laboring and burdened" because of the nature of sin

to the rest that is found with the Word of God; for God "dispatched his own word, healing them and delivering them out of their corruptions." And since he also says this: what, then, is this preference for sinners? and adds things similar to these, we shall answer that a sinner is never preferred to one who is not a sinner; but there are times when

a sinner who is conscious of his own sin and for this reason proceeds toward repentance, humbled over what he has done wrong, is preferred over the one who is thought to be a lesser sinner, but who does not think himself a sinner at all and instead is puffed up over certain things in which he seems to himself to be conscious of superior qualities, and is inflated over them. And this is made clear, to those willing to read the gospels with a fair mind, by the parable concerning the tax collector who said,

"Be merciful to me, a sinner" — and concerning the Pharisee who boasted with a certain wretched conceit, saying, "I thank you that I am not like the rest of humanity — grasping, unjust, adulterers — or even like this tax collector." For Jesus adds, concerning the statement about both, "It was this one, not the other, who went back down to his house set right before God; for everyone"

"who exalts himself will be humbled, and everyone who humbles himself will be exalted." We are therefore not blaspheming God, nor speaking falsely, when we teach that everyone whatsoever should become conscious of the smallness of humanity as measured against the majesty of God, and should always ask from him for what is lacking in our nature, since he alone is able to supply what is deficient in us. But Celsus supposes that we say such things as an inducement to those who are sinning,

as though we were unable to bring in any man who is truly good and just, and that for this reason we open our gates to the most impious and utterly depraved. But we, if anyone should examine our assembly with a fair mind, have more people to present who have not come from a particularly harsh life than those who have turned from utterly depraved sins. For it is the nature of those who are conscious in themselves of better things, praying

that the things proclaimed about the reward given by God to the better sort are true, to assent more readily to what is said than do those who have lived in an especially wretched manner — men who are kept, by their very conscience, from accepting that they will be punished with the punishment of the judge over all. Which punishment would indeed be fitting for one who has sinned so greatly, and would not be brought upon him by the judge over all contrary to right reason. But there are times

when even those who are utterly depraved are willing to accept the teaching about punishment, yet, having been steeped persistently in the hope resting on repentance, are held back from the habit of sinning, as though dyed through by wickedness and no longer able readily to depart from it toward the settled life lived according to right reason. Now Celsus, having also thought of this, says next — I do not know how —

the following: "And indeed it is surely plain to everyone that those who are by nature disposed to sin, and habituated to it, no one could ever change completely, not even by punishing them — much less by showing mercy; for to change one's nature entirely is a very difficult thing indeed — whereas the sinless are better companions in life." And in these words too Celsus seems to me to be very much mistaken,

in not granting to those who are by nature disposed to sin, and who are habituated to doing so, complete change — he who supposes that they are not even healed by punishments. For it is clearly evident that all of us human beings are by nature disposed to sin, and some are not only so disposed but are also habituated to sinning; yet not all human beings are incapable of receiving complete change. For there are, in every school of philosophy, and according to the divine

...word, they being reported to have changed so much that they themselves stand as an example of the best kind of life. Some cite, among heroes, Heracles and Odysseus; among later men, Socrates; and among those who lived just yesterday and the day before, Musonius. So it is not only in our case that Celsus lied when he said it is obvious to everyone that those who are by nature disposed and habituated to sin could, by no

means, even if punished, be brought at all to a change for the better. But rather, following the example of those who philosophized nobly and did not despair of recovering virtue, such a change is possible for human beings. But even if he did not establish with precision what he wanted to establish, we will nonetheless listen to him fairly and even so refute him for not speaking soundly. For he said: those who are disposed by nature to sin

and habituated to it, no one could ever completely change, not even by punishing them; and we have overturned what can be heard in that statement as far as possible. It is likely that he means to indicate something of this sort: that no one, by punishing them, could ever completely change those who are prone, not only by nature but also by habit, to the kinds of sins committed by the most depraved. And this claim, too, the historical record proves false, concerning certain

men who practiced philosophy. For who among men would not rank among the most depraved the one who at some point submitted to yielding to a master who set him up on a roof, so that he might let in anyone who wished to disgrace him? Such things are recorded of Phaedo. And who would not say that the man who burst in with a flute-girl and the revelers who shared his debauchery into the school of the most venerable Xenocrates, in order to insult a man whom

even his own companions admired, was not the most vile of all men? Yet reason had such power that, having turned even these men, it made them advance so far in philosophy that the one was judged by Plato worthy to narrate at length Socrates's discourse on immortality and to portray his steadfastness in prison, unconcerned about the hemlock but proceeding fearlessly and with complete

calm of soul through so many and so great matters, which even those who are altogether composed and troubled by no circumstance can scarcely follow; and the other, Polemo, having become from a debauchee a most self-controlled man, succeeded to the school of the renowned-for-dignity Xenocrates. It is therefore untrue, this claim of Celsus, that no one, not even by punishing them, could ever completely change those disposed by nature to sin and habituated to it. But

as for the order and composition and phrasing of the philosophical arguments, that such men produced these effects on those mentioned above, even though they had otherwise lived wickedly, is not at all astonishing. But when we consider what Celsus calls 'vulgar words,' as though filled with the power of incantations, and observe how these words swiftly urge multitudes on from a licentious life to the most stable life, and from

unjust to a more decent one, and from cowardly or unmanly to one so vigorous that, because of the piety that appeared in them, they even despise death - how could we not rightly marvel at the power within it? For 'the word' of those who first proclaimed these things and labored, so that they might establish churches of God - but also 'their proclamation' was, in persuasion,

has come about, but not of the sort of persuasion found among those who profess the wisdom of Plato or of any of the philosophers, since they were human beings possessing nothing beyond human nature. But the proof given by God in the case of Jesus' apostles was full of conviction, coming from "spirit and power." That is why their word — or rather, the word of God working through them — ran most swiftly and most sharply, transforming

many of those who were by nature and by habit given to sin — people whom no human being could have transformed even by punishing them, but whom the word remade, shaping and molding them according to its own purpose. And Celsus, drawing the conclusion that follows for him, says that to change one's nature completely is exceedingly difficult. But we, knowing that there is a single nature belonging to every rational soul, and asserting that none was made wicked by the one who

fashioned the universe, but that many have become bad because of their upbringing, their perversions, and the influences surrounding them, so that in some people wickedness has even become second nature — we are persuaded that for the divine word to change a wickedness that has become second nature is not only not impossible but not even very difficult, so long as one accepts that one must trust oneself to the God over all and do everything

with reference to pleasing him — in whose sight there is not one honor for the bad man and another for the good; "nor does the idle man die in the same way as the man who has done much." But if for some people changing is exceedingly difficult, one must say that the cause lies in their assent, which is reluctant to accept that the God over all is for each person

a just judge concerning everything done in life. For choice and practice have great power, even against things that seem most difficult and — to speak in hyperbole — nearly impossible. Has not human nature, when it wished to walk a rope stretched aloft through the middle of a theater, managed, while carrying such great weights, to accomplish this through practice and

attentiveness — and yet, when it wishes to live according to virtue, is it powerless to do so, even if it had previously been utterly base? But see whether the one who says such things is not rather accusing the nature that fashioned the rational animal than the one who has come to be. For if it has made human nature capable with regard to things so difficult that they are of no use at all, yet incapable with regard to

its own blessedness — well, even this is enough to answer the claim that to change one's nature completely is exceedingly difficult. Next he says that the sinless are better companions in life, without making clear whom he means by the sinless — those who are so from the beginning, or those who have become so through change. Now those who are sinless from the beginning are impossible to find, while those who become so through change are rarely found — people who become such

from having come to the saving word. They do not come to the word already being of such a character; for apart from the word — and a perfect word at that — it is impossible for a human being to become sinless. Then he raises, as if it were something said by us, the objection that there is nothing God's power cannot accomplish, without even seeing how this has been said, what "all things" is taken to mean here, and in what way he is able. About these matters it is not necessary to speak now, for he himself does not either, although he is able

...to take a stand against it plausibly. He took his stand—perhaps not even grasping the plausible objection that could be raised against this position, or grasping it but also seeing the reply to what is said. Now according to us, God can do all things which, though he is able to do them, do not make him depart from being God, from being good, and from being wise. But Celsus speaks as one who has not understood how it is said that

God can do all things—namely, that he will not want anything unjust—granting that he is indeed able to do the unjust thing too, but does not want to. But we say this: just as what is naturally suited to sweeten cannot, by that very fact of being sweet, make bitter on that same ground alone, nor can what is naturally suited to give light, by being light, cause darkness, so too God cannot do injustice; for

the power to do injustice is opposed to his divinity and to all the power that accords with it. But if any existing thing can do injustice because it is by nature also disposed toward injustice, it can do injustice precisely because it does not have it in its nature to be wholly incapable of injustice. After this he takes for granted something that is not granted by those who hold their beliefs more rationally, though perhaps it is supposed by certain foolish people—namely that

God, enslaved to pity for those who are pitied just as those enslaved to pity are, thereby lightens the burden of the wicked, while casting off the good who do nothing of the sort—which is most unjust. In our teaching, however, God lightens no wicked person's burden unless that person has already turned toward virtue, and he rejects no one who has already become good; nor for that matter does he lighten anyone's burden or show mercy to anyone merely because that person is an object of pity—to use the term

'mercy' in its more common sense. Rather, God receives, for the sake of their repentance, those who have severely condemned themselves for their sins, so that on this account they, as it were, mourn and lament themselves as lost with respect to their former deeds, and who show a noteworthy change—and likewise those who turn from a most wicked life. For virtue grants amnesty to such people, taking up residence in their souls and casting out the vice that had previously taken hold.

But even if what comes to be in the soul is not virtue but a noteworthy progress, this too is sufficient, in proportion to the degree of progress involved, to drive out and make vanish the flood of vice, so that it comes near to no longer being present in the soul at all. Then, as though speaking in the person of one who teaches our doctrine, he says the following: 'for the wise turn away from what is said by us,'

led astray and hindered by wisdom. We shall say in reply to this too that, if wisdom is knowledge of 'divine' and 'human' matters and of their causes, or, as the divine word defines it, 'a breath of God's own power, a pure outflowing of the Almighty's glory,' and 'a radiance of eternal light, and a spotless mirror of the working of God,'

'and an image of his goodness,' then no one who is truly wise would turn away from what is said by a Christian versed in Christianity, nor would he be led astray or hindered by it. For it is not true wisdom that leads astray but ignorance, and knowledge alone is stable among existing things, along with the truth that comes from wisdom. Yet should someone depart from wisdom's own definition, the

Whatever wise doctrine, then, you say he teaches with certain sophistries, we shall reply that the man who is truly wise, in the sense of wisdom you speak of, turns away from the words of God, being led astray by plausibilities and sophistries and tripped up by them. And since, according to our own account, "wisdom is not the knowledge of wickedness," while "wickedness" — to call it so — is a kind of "knowledge" among

those who hold false opinions and have been deceived by petty sophists, for this reason I would call it ignorance rather than wisdom in such cases. After this he again reviles the advocate of Christianity, and declares of him that he expounds ridiculous things, yet he neither proves nor clearly sets forth what he says is ridiculous. And in his abuse he says that no sensible person is persuaded by the doctrine, being distracted by the crowd of those who come to him.

He does the same thing also in this claim, that because of the multitude of ordinary people led by the laws, no sensible person, one might say, obeys Solon or Lycurgus or Zaleucus or any of the rest — especially if he takes as sensible the person of a certain quality according to virtue. For just as, in the case of these lawgivers, in accordance with what appeared useful to them, they made it their aim to surround the people with such

a way of life and with laws, so too God, legislating in Jesus for people everywhere, leads even those who are not sensible, insofar as it is possible for such people to be led toward what is better. This — as we have also said above — the God who is in Moses, knowing it well, says: "They provoked me to jealousy with what is not God, they angered me with their idols;

I also will provoke them to jealousy with what is not a nation, I will anger them with a nation void of understanding." And Paul too, knowing this, said: "It was what the world counts foolish that God selected, so as to bring shame upon the wise," calling "the wise" in a more general sense all those who seem to have advanced in learning but have fallen into godless polytheism. Since "claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the

incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds and four-footed animals and reptiles." He also accuses the teacher of seeking out senseless people. To him we would say: whom do you mean by the senseless? For strictly speaking, every base person is senseless. If, then, you call the base senseless, are you, in bringing people to philosophy, seeking to bring base people or refined ones? But it is not

possible to bring refined people, for they have already practiced philosophy; base people, then. But if base, then senseless. And you seek to bring many such people to philosophy; so you too are seeking the senseless. And I, even if I seek those who are called senseless in this way, do the same thing — as if a humane physician sought out the sick, so as to bring them remedies and restore their strength. But if by senseless you mean

not the unskilled but people more monstrous than ordinary human beings, I will answer you that I try to improve even these as far as possible, yet I do not wish to form the assembly of Christians out of them. For I seek rather the more skillful and the sharper, as able to follow the clarity of the riddles and of the things spoken with concealment across the law, the prophets, and the gospels, as containing nothing of value

...you have despised, without testing the mind within them, nor having tried to enter into the intention of those who wrote them. Since after this he also says that the one who teaches the doctrines of Christianity does something similar to a man who promises to make bodies healthy but turns people away from attending to skilled physicians, for fear that his own ignorance would be exposed by them, to this too we shall reply: which physicians do you mean,

from whom we turn away the uneducated? For surely you do not suppose that we direct our exhortation to reason toward those who practice philosophy, as though you should think that these are the physicians from whom we turn away those whom we call to the divine word. Either, then, he gives no answer, having nothing to say as to who these physicians are, or he is forced to take refuge among the uneducated, who themselves also babble in a servile way about

the many gods and whatever else uneducated people might say. Either way, then, he will be shown to have been refuted in vain for having brought into his argument someone who turns people away from skilled physicians. And if indeed we should turn away, from the philosophy of Epicurus and from the so-called Epicurean physicians of his school, those who are being deceived among them, how would we not be acting most reasonably in delivering them from the grievous sickness produced by the physicians of Celsus —

the sickness consisting in doing away with providence and bringing in pleasure as the good? But grant that we turn these people away, as from physicians, from other philosophers whom we exhort toward our own reasoning — namely those of the Peripatetic school, who abolish providence toward us and the relation of the divine to human beings — how would we not thereby be making pious and healing those who have turned to us, winning them over to a life devoted to the God who rules over all,

while freeing those who obey us from the deep wounds that arguments of the so-called philosophers had inflicted? But let it also be granted that we turn people away from other physicians — the Stoics, who introduce a perishable god and say that his substance is a body wholly mutable, alterable, and changeable, and who at some point destroy all things and leave only god remaining — how would we not, in this way too, be freeing those who

obey us from evils, and bringing them instead to the pious teaching about devoting oneself to the Craftsman and marveling at the Father of the Christian teaching, who has most benevolently, in a manner conducive to conversion, ordained teachings for souls to be sown throughout the whole human race? But even those afflicted with the folly concerning the transmigration of bodies, by physicians who drag the rational nature down, at one time into every irrational creature, and at another even

into that which lacks imagination altogether — should we not heal them? How would we not thereby be making those persuaded by our reasoning better in their souls — a reasoning that does not teach that, as a portion of punishment, the wicked person is reduced to insensibility or irrationality, but rather shows that there are certain remedial medicines in the toils and punishments brought upon the wicked by God? For this is what Christians who live and think prudently administer to the simpler folk, just as fathers do to

their quite infant children. For we do not, then, take refuge among infants and foolish rustics, saying to them, 'Flee the physicians,' nor do we say, 'See that none of you ever lays hold of knowledge,' nor do we claim that knowledge is something evil, nor have we gone mad enough to say that knowledge leads people astray from health of soul. But neither would we ever say that anyone has been destroyed by wisdom — we who

nor do you attend to me. Even if we teach, we say, no—attend to the God of the universe, and to Jesus the teacher of the lessons concerning him. None of us is so arrogant as to say to his acquaintances what Celsus has put into the mouth of the teacher: "I alone will save you." See, then, how much he falsely charges against us. But we do not even say that true

physicians destroy those whom they profess to heal. And he brings forward a second example against us, claiming that our teacher does something similar—as if a drunken man, coming among drunkards, were to abuse the sober as though they were drunk. Let him show, then, from Paul's own writings, for instance, that Jesus' apostle was drunk and that his utterances lacked the mark of a sober mind, or from what

John wrote, that his thoughts do not breathe the spirit of one who is sober-minded and free from the drunkenness that comes of vice. No one, then, who is sober-minded and teaches the doctrine of the Christians is drunk. But Celsus says these things while abusing us in an unphilosophical manner. And whom do we, who advocate the teachings of the Christians, abuse as though they were sober? Let Celsus say. For according to us all who speak to lifeless things as if to a god are drunk—

and why do I say drunk? For they are rather mad—rushing to the temples and bowing down to statues or to animals as though they were gods. And no less mad than these are those who suppose that things constructed by vulgar and, at times, utterly base men have been made in honor of the true gods. After this he likens the teacher to a man with diseased eyes, and the learners to those with diseased eyes as well, and

he says that this man, among those with diseased eyes, accuses the sharp-sighted of being blind. Who, then, shall we say are the Greeks who among us do not see, or those who, from the very greatness of the things in the world and the beauty of the works of creation, are unable to look up and perceive that it is fitting to worship and admire and revere only the one who has made these things, and none of the

things constructed by men and taken up for the honor of the gods could rightly be worshipped, whether apart from the creator God or together with him? For to compare things that admit no comparison at all with the infinite one, who surpasses in surpassing excellence every created nature, is the work of a mind blind in its understanding. We do not, then, say that the sharp-sighted are the ones with diseased eyes or the blind, but rather those who, in ignorance of God, grovel before the

temples and the statues and the so-called sacred festivals—these we declare to be blinded in mind, and this above all when, alongside their impiety, they also live in licentiousness, not even seeking out what deed is worthy of reverence, but doing everything worthy of shame. After this, having brought so many charges against us, he wishes to show that he has yet other things to say but passes over them in silence. His words run thus:

These charges I bring, and others like them, that I may not enumerate them all, and I say that they do wrong in leading men astray concerning God, so that they entice wicked men with vain hopes and persuade them to despise better things, on the ground that it will be better for them if they abstain from them. But to this it might also be said, on the basis of the actual conduct of those who come to Christianity, that they are not led astray as wicked men at all—

the word as much as the simpler people and (as most would call them) unrefined people do. For these, moved and driven by fear of the punishments that are announced, to abstain from the things for which the punishments exist, try to devote themselves to the piety of the Christian religion, so mastered by the word that, through fear of the eternal punishments named in accordance with the word,

they come to despise every torment devised against them by human beings, and death together with countless pains — which no sensible person would say is the work of wicked purposes. For how could self-control and moderation, or the sharing and fellowship of goods, be practiced from a wicked purpose? Nor indeed is the fear of the divine, to which the word summons the many as useful,

directed at those not yet able to see and choose what is choiceworthy for its own sake, and to choose it as the greatest good, surpassing every promise; from which it is not natural for such a thing to arise in one who chooses to live in wickedness. But if someone imagines that there is superstition rather than wickedness among the majority of those who believe the word, and blames our word for making people superstitious,

we will say to him that, just as one of the lawgivers said to the person asking whether he had established the finest laws for the citizens, that he had established not the laws that were finest without qualification but the finest of those they were capable of — so it might also be said on behalf of the father of the Christian word, that I established, for the improvement of character, the finest laws and teaching that the many were capable of, threatening not

false punishments and torments for sinners, but ones that are true and necessary, brought to bear for the correction of those who resist — though not that they altogether understand the intention of the one who punishes and the purpose of the sufferings; for this too is spoken usefully, in accordance with the truth, and with a certain concealment for their benefit. Still, on the whole, those who profess Christianity are not led into wickedness.

Nor indeed do we do violence to the divine; for we speak about it things that are both true and, while seeming clear to the many, are not clear to them as they are to the few who practice philosophy in accordance with the word. Since Celsus also says that those who become Christians are led on by empty hopes, we will say to him, who blames the teaching about the blessed life and

about fellowship with the divine, that as far as you are concerned, sir, those who have accepted the teaching of Pythagoras and Plato about the soul are also led on by empty hopes — the soul being by nature able to rise up to heaven's vault and, in the region above the heavens, to behold the sights beheld by the blessed spectators. But according to you, Celsus, those too who have accepted the soul's

continuance, and who live so as to become heroes and to have their dwelling with the gods, are led on by empty hopes. And perhaps also those who have been persuaded about the mind "from outside" as immortal, and as destined to have an independent existence, would be said by Celsus to be led on by empty hopes. Let him then contend, no longer hiding his own sect, but confessing himself an Epicurean, against what is held among Greeks and barbarians not

things said contemptibly about the immortality of the soul, or its continued survival, or the immortality of the mind, and let him show that these are mere arguments deceiving those who assent to them with empty hopes, while the doctrines of his own philosophy are free of empty hopes and either lead to good hopes, or—which better fits his position—produce no hope at all, because of the soul's

immediate and total dissolution. Unless, of course, Celsus and the Epicureans will refuse to call it an empty hope, the hope concerning the end that is their pleasure, which according to them is the good—the settled, stable condition of the flesh, and the confidence Epicurus places in that. Do not suppose that I have inappropriately brought in, against Celsus, on behalf of the Christian argument, those

who have philosophized about the immortality or continued survival of the soul; since we have certain things in common with them, we will show at a more fitting opportunity that the coming blessed life will belong only to those who have accepted the reverence for God that follows Jesus, together with a sincere and pure piety toward the maker of all things, unmixed with anything created whatsoever. But let whoever wishes show what better things we are persuading people to despise.

and let him set against it what belongs to us before God in Christ, that is, in the word and wisdom and every virtue—the blessed end that will befall those who have lived blamelessly and purely and have taken up an undivided and unsplit love toward the God of all, and that will be met by a gift of God—against the end promised by every philosophical school among Greeks or barbarians, or by any mystery-cult's

promise; and let him show that the end according to some other school is better than ours, and that it follows as true, while ours is unsuited to what God gives as a gift, nor to those who have conducted their lives well—or that these things were not spoken by a divine spirit that filled the souls of pure prophets. And let whoever wishes show that human arguments, acknowledged as such by all, are better than the

things demonstrated as divine and announced through inspiration. But of what better things do we teach those who accept them that they will be freed? For if it is not too offensive to say, it is self-evident that nothing can even be conceived as better than entrusting oneself to the God over all and devoting oneself to a teaching that draws one away from everything created, while leading one, through a living and animate word—who is also

living wisdom and Son of God—to the God over all. But since these remarks have taken on a sufficient scope, and the third volume of what has been dictated by us in reply to Celsus's treatise has thereby reached its natural limit, we will bring our discourse to a close at this point, and in what follows we shall contend against what Celsus wrote after this.

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