Clement of Alexandria · a new plain-English translation from the original language
But, as it seems, the philosophers of the Greeks, when they name God, do not know him, since they do not worship God as God ought to be worshiped. What is philosophized among them, according to Empedocles, having come as it were through many tongues, has been poured out vainly from mouths that saw but a small part of the whole. For just as the light of the sun, by means of a glass vessel full of water, is by art brought to kindle fire, so also philosophy, having taken its spark from the divine scripture, gives but a faint image of it in a few things. Yes, and just as all living creatures breathe the same air, yet differently, each in its own way and toward some different end, so too the majority pursue truth, or rather the account of truth. For they do not say anything about God, but expound their own passions, referring them up to God. For their life has become one of seeking the plausible, not the true; and truth comes not from imitation, but is learned. For our belief in Christ is not so that we might appear good, just as we do not pass our lives in the sun merely for the sake of appearing to be in the sun, but here for the sake of being warmed, so there we are compelled to be Christians for the sake of being noble and good, because the kingdom belongs especially to those who use force, to those who through inquiry and learning and complete joint discipline reap the becoming of a king.
He, then, who imitates mere seeming falsifies also his preconception. But when someone, having caught a spark of the matter, kindles this within, in the soul, by longing and learning, he sets everything in motion toward full knowledge on this basis. For that which someone does not apprehend, he neither longs for nor welcomes the benefit that comes from it. Therefore it is only afterward, at the completion of his right actions, that the gnostic imitates the Lord, so far as is attainable for men, having taken on a certain lordly quality for assimilation to God. But those who do not possess knowledge are not even able to bring truth under a rule. It is not possible, then, to partake of the gnostic contemplations unless we first empty ourselves of our former notions. For in the simplest sense truth is spoken of in common of everything intelligible and everything sensible. One may at once observe a truth of painting distinct from the vulgar sort, and a dignity of music distinct from the licentious kind. And so too there is a certain truth of philosophy distinct from that of the other philosophers, and a true beauty distinct from the counterfeit. One must therefore never busy oneself with the particular truths, of which truth itself is predicated, in place of truth itself, nor seek merely to learn names; for the matter concerning God is not one thing but countless things, and it makes a difference whether one seeks God or seeks the things concerning God. And speaking generally, in the case of every matter, the accidents must be distinguished from the essence.
And for my part it is enough to affirm: the Lord of all things is God. I say "of all" in the absolute sense, with nothing excepted or left aside. Since, then, there are two kinds of truth, names and things, some speak of names — those who spend their time on the beauties of speech, the philosophers among the Greeks — while the things belong to us, the barbarians. Thus the Lord deliberately chose to take on a humble bodily shape, so that none, extolling its fairness and marveling at its charm, might fall away from the things spoken and, clinging to what is left behind, be cut off from the intelligible things. One must therefore turn not about the wording but about what is signified. To those, then, who lay hold only of the wording and are not moved toward knowledge, the word is not entrusted as a matter of belief, since even crows imitate human voices without having any notion of the matter they speak of; but intelligent apprehension belongs to faith. So too Homer said "father of men and of gods," not knowing who the Father is nor how he is Father.
Just as for one who has hands it is natural to take hold, and for one who possesses sound eyes it is natural to see the light, so for one who has received faith it is proper by nature to partake of knowledge, if he is eager further to work upon and build upon the foundation laid, with gold, silver, and precious stones. He does not, then, merely promise to wish to partake, but begins; nor does he merely intend, but it is fitting for him to actually be kingly and full of light and knowing, and it was proper to wish to lay hold of realities not in name but in deed. For God, being good on account of his governance over all creation, wishing this to be saved, turned to making both this and the rest, granting from the beginning, as the first benefit, the very fact of coming into being; for everyone would agree that being is far better than not being. Then, according as the nature of each thing allowed, each came to be and comes to be, advancing toward what is better for itself.
So it is not absurd that philosophy too was given by divine providence as a preparatory training leading to the perfection that is through Christ, provided philosophy does not feel ashamed, in being schooled by barbarian knowledge, to advance toward truth. But the very hairs of our head have been numbered, and our most trivial movements — how then is philosophy not accounted worthy of reason? And indeed to Samson too power was given in his hairs, so that one might understand that not even the abandoned skills of this present existence — left lying upon the earth once the soul has departed — are granted without divine power. Just so, it says, providence from above extends from the leading parts, as from a head, down to all, like the ointment, it says, that runs down upon the beard of Aaron and upon the fringe of his garment (that is, of the great high priest, through whom all things came to be, and without whom not one thing came to be) — not into the world of the body, but, outside the people, as a garment, philosophy.
The philosophers, then, who have been trained by a perceptive spirit toward their own proper apprehension, whenever they busy themselves not with a mere part of philosophy but with philosophy entire, bearing witness to the truth in a spirit of love of truth and without conceit, even among those of other persuasions, wherever things are well said, advance toward understanding, in accordance with the divine dispensation, that ineffable goodness which continually brings forward the nature of existing things toward what is better, so far as this is possible; and then, having associated not only with Greeks but with barbarians too, they are led from common discipline to faith, and from faith to their own proper understanding; and having accepted the foundation of truth, they receive power to advance further in their inquiry, and from this point, having become disciples, they love, and yearning after knowledge, they hasten toward salvation. In this sense scripture says that a spirit of perception was given by God to the craftsmen; and this is nothing other than prudence, a power of the soul contemplative of existing things and of what follows, and discriminative and combinative of like and unlike, and directive and prohibitive, and conjectural of things to come. And it extends not only to the arts but to philosophy itself.
Why then, pray, is even the serpent called prudent? Because even in wicked deeds one can find a certain consistency, and discrimination, and combination, and a conjecturing of what is to come. And indeed most wrongdoings escape notice for this reason, that the wicked contrive for themselves ways of altogether and in every way escaping punishment. And prudence, being many-sided and extending through the whole world and through all human affairs, changes its name according to each of these: when directed toward primary causes, it is termed understanding; when it confirms this by demonstrative reasoning, it is named knowledge and wisdom and science; when it occurs in matters that tend toward reverent caution, and, without contemplation, accepts the ruling principle by the observed maintenance of what is worked out in it, it is called faith; and when, even in matters of sense, it gives assurance to what merely seems, as being in these cases the truest thing, it is called right opinion; and again, in actions accompanied by manual work, it is called art; and where, without contemplation of first causes, by observation of similar cases and by transference, it produces a certain impulse and disposition, it is called experience. And that other thing is properly its own, and is in truth lordly and governing, which the believer receives over and above all, after settled faith, by way of oversight — the holy spirit.
Philosophy, then, having partaken of a more discriminating perception, as has been shown from what was said before, shares in prudence. Now the rational process concerning things conceived, together with choice and assent, is called dialectic — confirmatory, through demonstration, of what is said concerning truth, and repellent of the objections that are brought against it. Those, then, who assert that philosophy has not come here from God run a risk: they must say it is impossible for God to know all particular things, and claim he is not responsible for all good things, even though each individual good in fact belongs to him. But nothing among existing things would have come into being at all in the beginning if God were unwilling; and if it was by his will, then philosophy is from God, since he wished it to exist in just this fashion, for the benefit of those who would not refrain from wrongdoing by any other means. For God knows all things, not only what exists but also what will be and how each thing will be; foreseeing the particular movements, he watches over everything and listens to everything, perceiving the soul naked within, and holding the concept of each particular thing throughout the ages; and what happens in theaters, with regard to each individual part, by way of looking-in and looking-around and looking-together, this happens also with God. For he beholds all things together, and each in its part, in a single glance, though not all in accordance with the same primary emphasis.
Indeed, many things in life take their origin also through some human reasoning, though they have received their spark from God. For instance, health comes about through medicine, and good bodily condition through gymnastic training, and wealth through business — all receiving their origin and presence according to divine providence, but according to human cooperation. And understanding, too, is from God. For instance, the choice of good men obeys especially the will of God. Wherefore many of the advantages are common to both good and bad men, yet they become beneficial only to the good and earnest, for whose sake God made them; for the power of God-given things is by nature suited for the use of good men. But moreover, the thoughts of virtuous men come about through divine inspiration, the soul being disposed in a certain way and the divine will being transmitted into human souls, particular divine ministers cooperating in such services; for the guardianship of the angels has been distributed according to nations and cities, and perhaps also of particular individuals, to some of whom certain angels have been assigned.
The shepherd, at any rate, cares also for each of his sheep individually, and his oversight is especially present and attentive to those who are distinguished in nature and capable of benefiting the multitudes. And these are the leading and educative men, through whom the working of providence is clearly shown, whenever God wishes, whether through education or through some form of rule and administration, to do good to men. And he wishes this always; wherefore he stirs up those who are fit for the beneficial working-out of the things that tend toward virtue and peace and toward well-doing. And everything virtuous both comes from virtue and is referred back to virtue, and is given either toward men becoming earnest, or toward those who already are such making use of the advantages that accord with nature; for it cooperates both in general matters and in particular ones.
How, then, is it not absurd, when men attribute disorder and injustice to the devil, to make him the giver of so virtuous a thing as philosophy? For it is more likely that a more benevolent power has become responsible to the Greeks for their becoming good men — that of divine providence and purpose. On the contrary, I think, it is the property of law and of every right reasoning to render to each what is fitting, and what is proper, and what falls to it. For just as the lyre belongs only to the lyre-player, and the flute to the flute-player, so the advantages of good men are their own possessions, and just as the nature of one who does good is to do good, just as fire's nature is to give heat and light's nature is to shine. A good man could not do evil, just as light will not darken nor fire chill. So conversely, vice could not produce anything virtuous; since its function is to work evil, just as darkness obscures vision. Philosophy, then, in making men virtuous, is not the work of vice. It remains, then, that it is of God, whose work alone is to do good, and everything that is given by God is both well given and well received. Indeed, the use of philosophy does not belong to bad men; but since it was granted to the most excellent among the Greeks, it plainly shows its source — providence, which distributes to each what is fitting according to worth. Fittingly, then, to the Jews was given the law, to the Greeks philosophy, until the coming; and from then on, the universal calling, gathering a people of surpassing righteousness by the teaching that is from faith, through the one Lord, the only one God of both — of Greeks and of barbarians alike, or better, of humankind entire.
We have often said that philosophy is what, in accordance with philosophy, attains to the truth, even if only in part; and further, that the good things found in the arts, as being found in arts, have their beginning from God. For just as doing something skillfully is comprehended within the theorems of the art, so acting prudently is placed under prudence; and prudence is virtue; and it is proper to it to know other things, but far more, its own affairs first of all; and wisdom, being a power, is nothing other than the knowledge of divine and human goods. And to God belong the earth and its fullness. Scripture, teaching that good things come to men from God, has declared this by divine power and by the strength of a distribution fitting for human assistance. For instance, there are three modes of every benefit and transmission from one to another: one by way of accompaniment, as the trainer of boys shapes the boy; another by way of resemblance, as one who urges another toward advancement by having advanced beforehand himself; and of these, the one cooperates with the learner, the other benefits together with the one who receives. The third mode is by way of command, whenever the trainer no longer shapes the learner nor demonstrates the wrestling-hold himself for the boy to imitate, but, as to one already well-practiced, commands the wrestling-hold by name.
The Gnostic, then, having been granted by God the power to act beneficially, does good: molding some by attendance on them, urging others on by way of likeness, and instructing and teaching others still by way of command. He himself, of course, has been benefited by the Lord in these same ways. So too the benefit that reaches down from God to men becomes discernible, with angels joining in the summons; for the divine power supplies good things through angels as well, whether these are seen or not. Such, too, is the manner of the Lord's own appearing. And at times, working through men's own conceptions and reasonings, the power breathes something into them and instills in their minds both strength and a more exact perception, supplying vigor and a bold eagerness both for inquiries and for deeds. Yet there also lie before us, for imitation and likeness, examples of virtue truly wonderful and holy, set down in the recorded deeds of Scripture. And indeed the mode that works by command is most evident both through the Lord's covenants and through the laws current among the Greeks, and also through the precepts delivered in philosophy. And, to put it concisely, all benefit for living, in the highest sense, is accomplished by God the Almighty, the Father who guides all things, through the Son -- who for this reason is, as the Apostle says, 'the Savior of all men, but especially of believers' -- while, proximately, it comes through those set nearest to each person, in accordance with the command and injunction of the one set nearest to the first cause, the Lord.
← All of Clement of Alexandria: Exhortation, Instructor & Miscellanies