Plutarch's essay 'On Praising Oneself Inoffensively' catalogues when and how a statesman can speak well of himself without provoking envy.
De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando ("On Praising Oneself Without Provoking Envy") is a short practical essay from Plutarch's Moralia, addressed to a man named Herculanus. Plutarch opens by conceding that everyone in theory condemns self-praise as offensive, yet almost no one, even among its critics, fully avoids it. Rather than simply forbidding the practice, he sets out to classify the circumstances in which speaking well of oneself is defensible for a public man, and the techniques that keep it from curdling into vanity.
Drawing on a dense parade of historical and literary examples — Pericles defending himself before the Athenian assembly, Epaminondas daring the Thebans to condemn him for his victories, Demosthenes weaving self-praise into praise of the city in On the Crown, Timoleon and Sulla crediting their successes to Fortune or the gods rather than to themselves, Themistocles reproaching an ungrateful Athens, Cicero, Cato, and Agathocles pointedly recalling his own humble origins — Plutarch builds a working typology: self-praise is tolerable in self-defense against slander, in the face of danger or death, when it is entangled with praise of one's country or comrades, when credit is shared with fortune or the divine, when a speaker deflects praise from a lesser virtue to a greater one, or when it is meant to spur on friends or overawe an enemy. He also flags its opposite dangers: rivaling another's reputation out of envy, or letting an unguarded moment of joy or old age's habit of moralizing tip into boasting.
The essay matters as a piece of applied Greco-Roman political ethics: it treats reputation management not as vanity but as a genuine problem of statecraft, since a leader's credibility with the people is itself a public resource. It also functions as a compact anthology of exemplary sayings from Homer, Pericles, Epaminondas, Demosthenes, and others, showing Plutarch's characteristic method of teaching virtue through curated anecdote rather than abstract argument.
“But to praise oneself blamelessly is possible, first, if you do it in defending yourself against slander or accusation”
— De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando · read this chapter →
“Men of Athens, this was the work of some god; we merely lent our hands.”
— De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando · read this chapter →
“he not only escapes boastfulness, emptiness, and love of honor”
— De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando · read this chapter →
“For a man ought to blush when he is praised, not to be shameless”
— De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando · read this chapter →
“no other kind of talk is so obnoxious or so hard to bear”
— De Se Ipsum Citra Invidiam Laudando · read this chapter →
It is a short essay in Plutarch's Moralia arguing that self-praise, though universally condemned in theory, is sometimes justified for a statesman, and cataloguing the circumstances and techniques that make it tolerable rather than offensive. Plutarch uses examples like Pericles, Epaminondas, Demosthenes, and Cicero to illustrate acceptable self-praise, especially in self-defense or danger.
Plutarch lists several licit occasions: defending oneself against slander or accusation, facing danger or death, praising one's country or friends alongside oneself, crediting fortune or the gods rather than one's own virtue, and redirecting praise toward one's finer qualities. He treats self-praise aimed at exhortation or steadying frightened allies in battle as similarly legitimate.
Herculanus is the addressee to whom Plutarch directs the whole essay, named once at the opening; nothing further about him is given in the text itself.
He cites Pericles defending his record before the Athenian assembly and on his deathbed, Epaminondas daring the Thebans to condemn his conquests, Demosthenes in On the Crown, Timoleon dedicating an altar to Chance, Sulla styling himself 'Favorite of Aphrodite,' and Agathocles recalling his potter's-workshop origins to disarm envy.
It shows Plutarch treating a leader's reputation as a practical political resource rather than mere vanity, and teaching virtue through curated historical anecdote rather than abstract moral rules, which is characteristic of his broader method across the Moralia and the Lives.
He argues that grand, self-assertive speech is more fitting for those in danger or misfortune, like the condemned Phocion, than for those already prosperous, since the fortunate risk seeming to indulge ambition while the unfortunate seem to be rising above their circumstance.
Moralia: Ad Principem Ineruditum · Moralia: Adversus Colotem · Moralia: Amatoriae Narrationes · Moralia: Amatorius · Moralia: An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum · Moralia: An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit · Moralia: An Virtus Doceri Possit · Moralia: An Vitiositas Ad Infelicitatem Sufficia · Moralia: Animine An Corporis Affectiones Sint Piores · Moralia: Apophthegmata Laconica · Moralia: Aquane An Ignis Sit Utilior · Moralia: Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti