A short Plutarch essay distinguishing envy from hatred by their origin, objects, and how each is soothed or provoked.
De Invidia et Odio ("On Envy and Hatred") is a brief essay from Plutarch's Moralia that takes on a psychological puzzle: envy and hatred feel alike, both being opposed to good will, so are they really the same passion wearing two names? Plutarch argues no, and builds his case through a series of concrete contrasts. Hatred is aimed at particular people (or even animals) believed to be wicked or threatening; envy is directed only at other human beings and is provoked simply by their faring well, with no wrong required. Hatred can be felt toward wild animals -- Germanicus's aversion to cocks, the Persian Magi killing mice -- while true envy, Plutarch insists, never arises between beasts, since animals have no concept of reputation.
The essay works through further asymmetries: people freely admit to hating someone but never admit to envying, disguising envy as anger or fear instead. Hatred grows as its object becomes more wicked; envy grows as its object becomes more virtuous or successful -- which is why the young Themistocles said he had accomplished nothing yet, since he was not yet envied. Great success can extinguish envy (no one envied Alexander once he ruled everything) but not hatred, which is why Alexander, envied by none, was hated by many and ultimately killed by conspirators. Misfortune stops envy but not enmity: no one envies a man in misfortune, but people go on hating fallen enemies.
Plutarch closes by examining how each passion ends. Hatred dissolves when a person is persuaded the wrong never happened, or comes to think well of the person, or receives a real benefit from them. None of these dissolves envy -- in fact a benefactor's virtue or good fortune can provoke more envy, not less, because envy resents the good itself. And where hatred aims to do lasting harm, envy typically does not wish for a rival's ruin, only for the shadow they cast to shrink -- like a neighbor trimming a tree that blocks his light. The essay matters as a compact case study in Plutarch's method: settling an ethical distinction not by definition but by cataloguing behavior, anecdote, and proverb.
“that the person hated is wicked, either in general or toward oneself; for those who believe themselves wronged are by nature inclined to hate, and they thrust forward and are vexed at those who are unjust or wicked in other ways, whereas they simply envy those who seem to fare well.”
— De Invidia Et Odio · read this chapter →
“Hence envy appears to be indefinite, like an inflammation of the eye that is disturbed by anything bright at all, while hatred is always fixed upon certain particular”
— De Invidia Et Odio · read this chapter →
“openly admit to hating many people, but none says he envies anyone. Indeed hatred of wickedness is among the things praised”
— De Invidia Et Odio · read this chapter →
“it is not likely that anyone envies Alexander or Cyrus, once they had conquered and become masters of all things”
— De Invidia Et Odio · read this chapter →
“many who envy their familiars and kin would not wish them to perish or to suffer misfortune, yet they are burdened by their prospering;”
— De Invidia Et Odio · read this chapter →
It is a short essay arguing that envy and hatred, though often treated as the same feeling, are actually distinct passions with different causes, objects, and remedies. Plutarch works through the distinction using anecdotes about figures like Alexander, Themistocles, and Socrates' accusers.
Hatred arises from believing someone is wicked or has wronged you, and it can be aimed at animals as well as people; envy arises simply from someone else faring well or gaining a good reputation, and Plutarch says it occurs only between human beings. Hatred is fixed on particular deserving targets, while envy is provoked indiscriminately by anything bright or successful.
Plutarch says that once Alexander had conquered everything and become master of all things, his overwhelming success extinguished envy, much like the sun removes shadow when it stands directly overhead. But his superiority did not stop people from hating him, and he was eventually plotted against and killed by men who hated him.
No. He argues wild animals can and do hate one another, citing eagles and serpents or lions and cocks as natural enemies, but they cannot envy, because envy depends on recognizing another's good reputation or fortune, a concept Plutarch says animals do not grasp.
Plutarch says hatred dissolves when someone is persuaded they were not wronged, forms a good opinion of the person they hated, or receives a real benefit from them. He argues envy resists all three: a benefactor's virtue or good fortune can provoke more envy rather than less, since envy is pained precisely by the good it sees in others.
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